

# Foreign Policy Appointments

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## Abstract

How do leaders select their top-level foreign policy appointees? Existing explanations point to appointees' hands-tying value at the international bargaining table, or their ability to insulate leaders from domestic political criticism. This paper evaluates these explanations through a formal model of the domestic and intragovernmental politics surrounding an international crisis. In the model, a leader selects a foreign policy appointee, anticipating how the appointee will shape the advice he receives in the crisis, the electoral incentives he faces, and ultimately the policies that he and his foreign counterparts pursue as a consequence. The analysis uncovers a fundamental strategic tension in the leader's ability use appointments to advance his core political and policy objectives—deterring foreign aggression, obtaining valuable policy advice, and maximizing domestic approval: any appointment that advances one of these objectives invariably comes at the cost of another, and the leader's appointment strategy must balance across these tradeoffs. Analyzing cross-national appointment patterns to the offices of ministers of defense and foreign affairs, we find descriptive evidence consistent with the model's predictions: leaders from dovish parties are more likely than leaders from hawkish parties to select cross-partisan and politically independent appointees, and such appointments are less likely for leaders of either party as they approach reelection.

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When new leaders are elected to office, one of the first tasks awaiting them is to select their top foreign policy advisors. Conventional wisdom among policymakers holds that these decisions carry significant international ramifications. When introducing Lloyd Austin for a confirmation hearing as President Biden’s defense secretary, Senator Dan Sullivan proclaimed that “our allies will take comfort in his confirmation, and our adversaries will take pause”.<sup>1</sup> A primary motive behind President Obama’s choice to retain Robert Gates as defense secretary, the latter recounted in his memoir, was that “my staying in place would show foreigners that U.S. resolve would be undiminished”.<sup>2</sup> Putting a finer point on the matter, Senate Foreign Relations chair Bob Corker described President Trump’s foreign policy team as “those people that help separate our country from chaos...[and] make sure that the policies we put forth around the world are sound and coherent”.<sup>3</sup> Analysts and scholars, even those of the realist tradition, frequently refer to major U.S. military engagements as “belonging” to a particular appointee (“McNamara’s War” in Vietnam,<sup>4</sup> “Madeleine’s War” in Kosovo,<sup>5</sup> “Hillary’s War” in Libya<sup>6</sup>), crediting the appointee as the “architect” or “father” of the conflicts undertaken during their time in government service.<sup>7</sup>

Yet despite the perceived importance of top-level foreign policy appointments, we have a limited understanding of how leaders choose whom to place in these roles. One standard logic holds that principals can achieve better bargaining outcomes by delegating bargaining authority to an agent with misaligned preferences.<sup>8</sup> This sort of hands-tying logic has been used to explain the value of other domestic institutions, notably legislatures<sup>9</sup> and independent central banks,<sup>10</sup> in improving the credibility of a state’s international commitments. Other explanations point to the domestic political value of certain appointments: anecdotal accounts suggest that appointees can provide leaders with “political cover”<sup>11</sup> in the face of domestic criticism, enabling them to “inoculate themselves against the ‘weak on defense’ charge”<sup>12</sup> or to obtain “insurance against recrimination”;<sup>13</sup> experimental evidence confirms that public perceptions of a leader’s foreign policy performance can

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<sup>1</sup>C-SPAN (2021)

<sup>2</sup>Gates (2014, ch.8)

<sup>3</sup>Lima (2017)

<sup>4</sup>Mearsheimer (1993)

<sup>5</sup>Isaacson (1999)

<sup>6</sup>Warrick (2011)

<sup>7</sup>Mearsheimer (1993)

<sup>8</sup>Schelling (1960)

<sup>9</sup>Putnam (1988); Milner (1997)

<sup>10</sup>Rogoff (1985); Bodea (2010)

<sup>11</sup>Casey (2014)

<sup>12</sup>Spivak (2015)

<sup>13</sup>Karnow (1994, 282)

be influenced by public communication from appointees.<sup>14</sup>

While these accounts provide important insights into the problem at hand, they also raise a number of questions. Appointments would serve a useful hands-tying function if they did in fact tie the leader’s hands to a certain course of international conduct. But unlike other widely studied domestic institutions, foreign policy appointees have no *de jure* autonomy in the policy process; they typically serve in their roles “subject to the direction of the President”<sup>15</sup> and may be removed from office at will.<sup>16</sup> In this context, the credibility of any delegation of authority must be explained, rather than assumed.

Moreover, these accounts generally address only one side of the ledger. If certain appointments can strengthen the leader’s hand at the international bargaining table, or bolster her domestic political standing, why would the leader not always select those appointees? What are the tradeoffs implied by different appointment strategies? Why do we observe variation in appointments made by different leaders, or by the same leader at different points in their administration?

To address these questions, we study a formal model of the domestic and intragovernmental politics surrounding an international crisis. We examine a leader’s selection of a foreign policy appointee, in anticipation of how the appointee will shape the advice he receives in the crisis, the electoral incentives he faces, and ultimately the policies that he and his foreign counterparts pursue as a consequence. The analysis uncover a fundamental strategic tension between the appointment incentives discussed above: in general, we find that any appointment that advances the leader’s international policy objectives will undermine his domestic political standing, and vice versa. This core insight carries implications for how the leader will optimally staff his administration, and how those appointment decisions will affect citizen welfare and international conflict and cooperation.

The model examines the leader’s appointment strategy with respect to two appointee attributes: the appointee’s ideological *bias* (her “hawkishness” or “dovishness”), which denotes her willingness to use force to achieve foreign policy objectives; and her political *loyalty* to the leader, or conversely her *independence*, which denotes her willingness to publicly criticize a policy decision that she opposes. We consider how the leader’s incentives regarding each attribute vary depending on the leader’s partisan identity, as a member of either a Hawk party or a Dove party. To microfound the mechanisms of appointee influence, we model appointees as serving a purely informational function—providing private policy advice to the leader to inform his crisis response, and

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<sup>14</sup>Saunders (2018); Jost and Kertzer (2021).

<sup>15</sup><https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/113>

<sup>16</sup><https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-2/the-removal-power>

communicating publicly with a domestic audience to inform their assessment of the leader’s crisis performance.

With this approach, the analysis yields three primary implications. First, we find that appointees can enhance deterrence against foreign aggression, through two distinct but related mechanisms: an *advisory* mechanism, and a *fire-alarm* mechanism. Through the advisory mechanism, the leader selects advisors with known biases from whom he will subsequently solicit policy advice. In doing so, the leader can effectively outsource his “resolve” to a more hawkish advisor—but only insofar as it remains credible for the leader to follow her advice once a crisis arises. Through the fire-alarm mechanism, the leader can appoint a politically independent agent who may let it be known publicly when she believes the leader to have acted against the voters’ interest in his crisis response. This serves to mitigate the moral hazard problem between the voters and the leader, as the threat of exposure can discipline leaders into governing more in line with the voter’s interest. While the advisory mechanism can improve deterrence under leaders of either party, only Dove leaders receive a deterrent benefit from the fire-alarm mechanism; for Hawk leaders, curbing their excessive willingness to use force serves to weaken rather than enhance deterrence.

A second implication of the analysis pertains to citizen welfare. Insofar as the the leader is able to enhance deterrence through the selection of a foreign policy appointee, this deterrent benefit necessarily comes at a cost: in equilibrium, the appointment will either create distortions in the leader’s crisis response away from the voter’s ideal (that is, undermining *policy responsiveness*), or muddle the voters’ ability to distinguish between leaders whose true preferences do or do not align with their own (that is, undermining *electoral selection*)—or it may undermine both aspects of citizen welfare simultaneously.

Third, in light of these effects on deterrence and welfare, the analysis yields novel implications regarding the optimal appointments that leaders of different parties will select. Contrary to intuition, the optimal appointment is not necessarily one that maximizes deterrence, nor one that provides the most accurate policy advice, nor one that yields the best reelection prospects for the appointing leader; rather, the leader invariably faces tradeoffs among these objectives, and must weigh gains on any one criterion against losses in another. Generally we find that leaders of either party will never select dovishly-biased appointees, and that both will select hawkishly-biased advisors if they place sufficient value on deterrence. A major asymmetry emerges, however, regarding political loyalty: leaders from the Dove party are strictly more likely to select politically independent appointees, as compared to leaders from the Hawk party. Yet their reasons for doing so are

highly contingent: an independent appointee may be selected solely to improve electoral prospects in some cases, but in other cases selected for deterrent purposes despite the fact that doing so is electorally harmful.

Empirically, we provide descriptive cross-national evidence consistent with this third main implication. Drawing on annual data on cabinet compositions and codings of party manifestos for 51 democracies from 1966–2018, we observe the patterns of partisan asymmetry described above in appointments to the office of minister of defense: leaders from a Dove party are more likely to appoint Hawkish defense ministers than the reverse, and Dove party leaders are more likely to appoint defense ministers who are non-partisan or from outside the leader’s party. We also find, consistent with the theory, that co-partisan appointments are more likely as the leader approaches reelection. Patterns of appointments of foreign affairs ministers are similar, though less pronounced.

This study contributes to three primary bodies of literature in international relations and political economy. First, it advances our understanding of the politics of personnel selection in foreign policy. A recent review by Saunders identifies this as the primary component missing from the recent resurgence of literature on foreign policy elites: “Beyond chief executives,” writes Saunders, “the selection of many crucial foreign policy elites remains mostly unexplored.”<sup>17</sup> This study provides both a theoretical framework for understanding the incentives and tradeoffs that chief executives face in choosing their most important foreign policy advisors, and the first cross-national evidence of how these incentives bear on the selection of ministers of defense and foreign affairs.

Second, this study contributes to the theoretical research on international crisis bargaining by investigating two sources of information that feature prominently in the literature. Canonical models of crisis bargaining assume that a leader observes some piece of private information that bears on their conflict payoff— such as the cost of conflict, or the valuation of the prize in dispute<sup>18</sup>— without interrogating the source of the information or the process by which it reaches the leader. Other domestically-oriented theoretical models focus on how voter assessments of leader performance shape leaders’ incentives in crisis bargaining,<sup>19</sup> without considering how those perceptions are influenced by elite cues and framing.<sup>20</sup> The present study advances our understanding of both of these information transmission processes, highlighting the role that executive appointees play in providing the leader with information to guide policymaking, and providing the voters with

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<sup>17</sup>Saunders (2022, 9.3)

<sup>18</sup>Fearon (1997); Powell (2002)

<sup>19</sup>Smith (1998); Debs and Weiss (2016)

<sup>20</sup>Levendusky and Horowitz (2012); Guisinger and Saunders (2017)

information to assess leader performance.

Finally, this study contributes to the literature on accountability in multi-layered governing hierarchies more broadly, beyond the context of foreign policy. The formal literature on political accountability generally studies the delegation of authority from voters to elected leaders,<sup>21</sup> and from leaders to bureaucratic subordinates,<sup>22</sup> in isolation from one another. Studies that do consider both agency relationships in tandem focus on a setting in which an elected politician appoints a bureaucrat who then sets policy directly.<sup>23</sup> Here, we do not assume that the leader can credibly delegate policy-making authority to his agent; rather, the politician can only choose how to make use of the advice that his agent provides. This approach yields novel and generalizable results regarding how electoral incentives condition the leader’s willingness to follow his appointees’ advice, and how internal advisory processes in turn color voter assessments of the leader’s performance.

## 1 Multi-layered Agency Problems in Foreign Policy

This section presents a non-technical overview of the paper’s argument. The theory centers around the strategic interdependence between two principal-agent relationships—one between the leader and the voter, and another between the appointee and the leader—and how these relationships influence the state’s foreign policy behavior. We begin by describing the international context in which the domestic game unfolds, then discuss the two agency relationships.

### 1.1 Deterrence at the International Level

We follow a long tradition in the international conflict literature by studying a game of crisis bargaining, between a foreign “challenger” state and a domestic “defender” state.<sup>24</sup> The foreign challenger wants to take some provocative action against the defender’s interests (e.g. a territorial incursion against an ally, or the development or testing of a weapon program); if they do, the defender must then choose whether or not to retaliate against the provocation (e.g. by arming the ally, intervening military, or imposing punitive sanctions). The defender’s goal is to deter the challenger from taking the provocative action, which requires convincing them of two facts: first, that the challenger’s provocation will be met by costly retaliation which renders the provocation undesir-

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<sup>21</sup>Ashworth (2012)

<sup>22</sup>Gailmard and Patty (2012)

<sup>23</sup>Fox and Jordan (2011); Yazaki (2018)

<sup>24</sup>For an overview, see Powell (2002).

able; and second, that such costs will not be imposed if the challenger refrains from provocation.<sup>25</sup> In the current setting, the challenger faces uncertainty regarding the defender’s true preferences, and thus regarding the credibility of the defender’s commitment to uphold both conditions necessary for successful deterrence. In light of this uncertainty, we examine how an appointee within the defender state might alter the state’s crisis response, and the foreign adversary’s expectations thereof. Insofar as she can, this will affect the adversary’s incentive to instigate the crisis in the first place.

## 1.2 Hawks, Doves, and Electoral Accountability

As mentioned above, we theorize domestic politics as consisting of two key principal-agent relationships. Our model of the first relationship—that between the leader and voter—draws from the literature on adverse selection models of electoral accountability, which views elections as opportunities for citizens to select “good types” of leaders to whom to delegate political authority.<sup>26</sup> What exactly constitutes a “good type” depends on the context of analysis; a common approach, which we adopt here, is to model politicians as holding differing degrees of ideological (mis)alignment with voters, where voters seek to select candidates who more closely share their primitive preferences over policy.<sup>27</sup>

Specifically, we follow Schultz in assuming that the leader is known to be from one of two parties—a “Dove” party or a “Hawk” party—with differing reputations regarding their relative willingness to enter into conflict to defend the national interest.<sup>28</sup> Unknown to the voter (and the foreign challenger) is whether the leader is a “moderate” whose policy preferences align with the voter’s, or an “extremist” who is either excessively willing (if an extreme Hawk) or excessively unwilling (if an extreme Dove) to engage in conflict. While extremists hold strong ideological commitments to their preferred policies, moderate leaders are more willing to adjust their policy responses in the face of uncertainty, and to adapt to the facts of the particular situations they confront. As we will see below, this makes moderates more intrinsically receptive to expert policy advice when formulating their crisis response.

Given this specification of voter preferences and informational asymmetry, a straightforward implication is that leaders face an electoral incentive to act “against type”: Hawk party leaders

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<sup>25</sup>Schelling (1960).

<sup>26</sup>Fearon (1999)

<sup>27</sup>Maskin and Tirole (2004); Schultz (2005); Fox and Jordan (2011)

<sup>28</sup>Schultz (2005)

benefit from conciliatory foreign policy behavior that signals moderation, and Dove party leaders conversely benefit from demonstrating a willingness to use force. This implication receives empirical support from a number of experimental studies: Trager and Vavreck, for instance, find that independent voters harshly penalize Democratic presidents for staying out of a conflict, but reward Republican presidents for doing the same.<sup>29</sup> Mattes and Weeks likewise find that Dove leaders face public disapproval for seeking a conciliatory policy against a foreign adversary to a far greater extent than do Hawk leaders; a key mechanism behind this result is that Hawk leaders are largely perceived as moderates when they pursue such a policy, whereas Dove leaders are perceived as extreme pacifists.<sup>30</sup>

### 1.3 Incentives and Influence of Executive Appointees

Our model of the second agency relationship—between the leader and his appointed advisors—builds on a long tradition of scholarship on bureaucratic politics and foreign policy. The most prominent work in this literature is Graham Allison’s *Essence of Decision*, which proposed a “governmental politics” model of foreign policy decision-making, characterized by “bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government”.<sup>31</sup> In this view, bargaining with subordinates is an inevitable feature of executive governance; it arises by assumption that appointees can and do constrain their leader’s international conduct.

This early wave of scholarship was subsequently criticized for its underestimation of presidential power in foreign affairs. “Since the president has personally appointed the top officials in his administration and can dismiss them at any time,” Bendor and Hammond ask, “and since he has substantial formal authority. . . to order them to do what he wants, why must the president bargain with them?”<sup>32</sup> The present study takes up this question: starting from the premise that formal authority is vested in the leader who sits atop the governmental hierarchy, we proceed to interrogate how and under what conditions bureaucratic delegation can constrain the leader’s foreign policy behavior.

Our explanation focuses on two informational channels through which appointees can influence foreign policy: an *advisory* mechanism, and a *fire-alarm* mechanism. We outline each of these mechanisms in turn, and then discuss the strategic interdependence between them.

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<sup>29</sup>Trager and Vavreck (2011)

<sup>30</sup>Mattes and Weeks (2019)

<sup>31</sup>Allison (1971). Halperin and Clapp (2006)[1974] shares a similar theoretical orientation.

<sup>32</sup>Bendor and Hammond (1992, 315)



### 1.3.1 Appointees as Advisors

One mechanism through which appointees can influence the leader’s behavior is their provision of policy-relevant advice. Canonical models of bureaucratic delegation assume that a bureaucratic agent holds an informational advantage over a political principal, which provides the basic rationale for the principal’s willingness to delegate.<sup>33</sup> The cost of the agency relationship, from the principal’s perspective, is that the agent’s interests may diverge from the principal’s, and the agent can exploit her informational advantage for her benefit and at the principal’s expense.

The present analysis adopts this approach. We assume that the agent has expertise with respect to some policy-relevant state of the world, and she provides private advice to the leader to inform his policy decision.<sup>34</sup> The preference divergence between the principal and agent takes the form of the agent holding some degree of ideological “bias”, which leads her to shade her advice in a hawkish or dovish direction. However, we do not treat this misalignment as an inevitable cost of the agency relationship; rather we show that, even when a perfectly unbiased agent is available, the leader may actually prefer to commit *ex ante* to distorting his own informational environment by relying on biased advice.

Some recent studies have examined the sort of internal advisory processes modeled here. Jost, Kertzer, Min and Schub show that the decisions coming out of a foreign policy advisory meeting with the U.S. president systematically reflect the hawkishness of the group of advisors in attendance at that meeting.<sup>35</sup> Saunders argues that the ability of advisors to sway their leader’s foreign policy decisions depends on the relative experience and expertise of the leader and his advisors,<sup>36</sup> a result which we recover formally in the present analysis.

But if we believe—as is widely posited in the electoral accountability literature discussed above—that leaders vary in the rigidity of their ideological commitments, and thus in their receptiveness to expert advice, then the process of foreign policy advising takes on a more political complexion. Providing perfectly accurate information through private advisory channels may be insufficient to sway a leader’s decision when he is strongly predisposed to a particular course of action. Thus the advisory mechanism is most effective when operating in conjunction with the

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<sup>33</sup>See Gailmard and Patty (2012) for a review.

<sup>34</sup>Consistent with existing formal-theoretic work on the subject, we reduce the complex process of advising and persuasion to a binary cheap-talk message in favor of one policy or another. See Calvert (1985); Kydd (2003); Lindsey (2017).

<sup>35</sup>Jost, Kertzer, Min, and Schub (2022). Schub (2022) examines variation in advice provided by different foreign policy bureaucracies, a topic we consider briefly in Appendix 10.2.

<sup>36</sup>Saunders (2017)

second mechanism of influence, as we discuss next.

### 1.3.2 Appointees as Fire Alarms

A second channel of appointee influence over foreign policy is through their communication to a domestic audience that can hold the leader accountable. We refer to this as the *fire-alarm* mechanism.<sup>37</sup> The potential misalignment of interests between the leader and voters, along with the leader’s private information regarding the value of the policy options he faces, give rise to a moral hazard problem, whereby the voters cannot perfectly monitor the leader’s action to ensure that he is governing in their interest. If the appointee can credibly threaten to expose the leader’s crisis mismanagement to the voters—to sound the fire alarm—this can serve to discipline the leader’s behavior and mitigate the moral hazard.

Bendor and Hammond suggest a mechanism of this sort as a potential microfoundation for the bargaining between presidents and subordinates that is assumed into Allison’s model: “While the president can often order his political appointees and their respective bureaucracies to do his bidding,” the authors write, “they may be able to hurt him politically if they disagree with his choices and make their disagreements known to outside supporters.”<sup>38</sup> Halperin and Clapp likewise identify “finesse in threatening to leak information or to resign” and “aptitude for mobilizing support outside the bureaucracy” as key factors that determine an official’s influence over policy.<sup>39</sup>

Public signaling by appointees can manifest in a variety of ways. In the most extreme instance, an appointee can resign in protest over a particular decision made by the leader. Other forms of protest include issuing public statements, leaking damaging information to the press or to other actors across the government, or simply refraining from expressing support for the leader’s policy when given the opportunity to do so. Even these milder forms of protest carry some risk of losing standing with the president—potentially to the point of being forced out of office—so for simplicity we focus on the stark case of resignation in the formal analysis.

Some recent experimental work has found that these sorts of public cues from appointees can affect voter perceptions of a leader’s foreign policy performance. Saunders shows that public approval of a president’s decision regarding military intervention can be influenced by an advisor’s public statement supporting or opposing the intervention.<sup>40</sup> Jost and Kertzer further show that

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<sup>37</sup>McCubbins and Schwartz (1984); Saunders (2018) applies the term to public communication from presidential advisors.

<sup>38</sup>Bendor and Hammond (1992, 315)

<sup>39</sup>Halperin and Clapp (2006, 226)

<sup>40</sup>Saunders (2018)

voters are attuned to quite nuanced differences in appointee attributes—including prior experience, institutional position, age and education—when determining how much stock to put in a given official’s policy recommendation.<sup>41</sup>

If appointees taking their disagreements public can harm the leader’s standing with some relevant domestic audience, then it stands to reason that the leader may opt to accommodate the appointee’s policy concerns rather than suffer an electoral penalty. Two questions arise, however. First, while the threat of going public may be useful in advancing the appointee’s policy goals, why would the appointee actually want to carry out the threat? Doing so requires overcoming the daunting “effectiveness trap”: as Thomson writes, “The inclination to remain silent or to acquiesce in the presence of the great men—to live to fight another day, to give on this issue so that you can be ‘effective’ on later issues—is overwhelming.”<sup>42</sup> Once the appointee has lost on a particular issue, it is not obvious why she would sacrifice future opportunities for policy influence in order to make a statement about the past. But if this incentive is dominant, then the threat of the fire alarm is rendered non-credible, and the leader’s behavior is unchanged. Second, when the appointee does go public, why should the voters listen to what she has to say? Why is the appointee’s choice to sound the alarm informative of the leader’s quality, rather than merely indicative of the appointee’s own preferences and priorities?

The formal analysis demonstrates that the answer to these questions lies in the interaction between the two mechanisms of appointee influence. In the model, the primary motive for appointees to remain in government service is the opportunity to influence future policy decisions through the advisory process—the ever-present desire for effectiveness, as Thomson describes. Crucially, however, this potential for influence varies across leaders. If the appointee assesses that the leader is unwilling to make use of expert advice, then her choice to speak out or resign comes at a lower cost than if she thought the leader was receptive to expertise. It is this differential costliness that renders appointee protest an informative signal of the leader’s quality: the decision to protest is indicative of what sort of future opportunities the appointee believes she is giving up. This in turn explains why the audience would revise their appraisal of the leader in response to the appointee’s action.

We can see this logic exemplified in two high-profile appointees’ decisions over whether or not to resign in the face of disagreements with their principals. When President Trump announced

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<sup>41</sup>Jost and Kertzer (2021)

<sup>42</sup>Thomson (1968)

his intention to withdraw American troops out of the anti-ISIS coalition fighting in Syria, the unexpected decision presented Defense Secretary James Mattis with “the most urgent crisis of his nearly two years in the Cabinet”.<sup>43</sup> Mattis pleaded with the president to reverse course, but he was firmly rebuffed. In response, Mattis resigned from his position, releasing a public resignation letter in which he outlined his core beliefs regarding “treating allies with respect and also being clear-eyed about both malign actors and strategic competitors”. “Because you have the right to have a Secretary of Defense whose views are better aligned with yours on these and other subjects,” Mattis wrote, “I believe it is right for me to step down from my position.”<sup>44</sup>

William Perry also confronted a major policy disagreement with President Clinton during his time as defense secretary, in this case regarding the rapid accession of several Eastern European countries into NATO. “In the strength of my conviction, I considered resigning”, Perry later reflected. “But I concluded that my resignation would be misinterpreted. . . President Clinton had given me just what I had requested—an opportunity to state my case—and unfortunately, I had not been persuasive enough.”<sup>45</sup>

These examples illustrate the forward-looking assessments that appointees engage in when deciding whether to speak out against a leader. Perry’s policy disagreement with Clinton was just that—a disagreement. He emerged from the experience still believing Clinton to be receptive to expert advice, so he saw value in continuing to serve in the administration. Mattis’s disagreement with Trump, however, revealed a deeper defect. Mattis had previously “operated under the illusion that he could change Trump’s views, or at least some of his foolish ways”,<sup>46</sup> Trump’s handling of the Syria withdrawal indicated to Mattis that there was little potential for him to contribute constructively to future policy decisions. It was this inference, we argue, that drove Mattis’ decision to resign, and that in turn shaped the audience’s interpretation of his decision.

#### 1.4 Implications for Leaders’ Appointment Strategies

Anticipating these mechanisms through which appointees can influence the leader’s behavior, and the ensuing effects on the foreign adversary’s incentives, the leader must decide how to optimally staff his administration. The model considers appointees selected from a two-dimensional attribute space, corresponding to the two mechanisms of influence described above: the appointee’s bias, in

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<sup>43</sup>Goldberg (2019)

<sup>44</sup><https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/read-james-mattis-full-resignation-letter>

<sup>45</sup>Perry (2015, 129)

<sup>46</sup>Goldberg (2018)

a hawkish or dovish direction; and the appointee’s loyalty (or her independence), representing her willingness to speak out against the leader.

Though it may be most intuitive to think of these attributes as highly correlated—dovish appointees under Dove leaders will be loyal, hawkish appointees disloyal, and vice versa for Hawk leaders—this is not always the case. Some examples are instructive in this regard. Robert Gates, the secretary originally appointed by George W. Bush and retained for the first two years of the Obama administration, proudly identified himself as a hawk on national security matters.<sup>47</sup> Yet he also proved to be a politically independent actor with respect to both presidents under whom he served. In his confirmation hearing in December 2006, when asked “do you believe that we are currently winning in Iraq?”, Gates gave the surprisingly blunt response, “No, sir”<sup>48</sup>—directly contradicting President Bush’s answer of “Absolutely we’re winning” just two months prior.<sup>49</sup> Later, when President Obama was deliberating options for a troop surge in Afghanistan in late 2009, Gates was one of the chief proponents of a larger troop presence. Beyond his efforts of internal advocacy in favor of his preferred policy, it was his willingness to resign in protest—commonly understood, if not threatened explicitly<sup>50</sup>—that made his position especially persuasive.

Robert McNamara was likewise a hawkish defense secretary brought in to an administration intent on demonstrating that it was not as dovish as its party image suggested. In contrast to Gates, however, McNamara—though a registered Republican, and a consistent advocate for a more interventionist foreign policy (at least in the early years of his tenure)—was a fiercely loyal subordinate to both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson.<sup>51</sup> As one telling example, McNamara developed a practice of categorizing his internal memoranda as “draft recommendations”, which he would then revise to reflect the president’s ultimate decision, “so that there would be no record for history of any difference between the Secretary of Defense and the President”.<sup>52</sup>

Another Kennedy appointee, Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles, fits the opposite model of a dovish agent with relatively weak political loyalties to his co-partisan president. Bowles, as an intellectual leader of the party’s liberal wing prior to his appointment, came to be seen by his allies as a “litmus paper for the Administration”, who could inform them if the administration was

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<sup>47</sup>[https://www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/SiteCollectionDocuments/Reports/2009/July%202009/Day17/gates\\_econclub\\_071609.pdf](https://www.airandspaceforces.com/PDF/SiteCollectionDocuments/Reports/2009/July%202009/Day17/gates_econclub_071609.pdf)

<sup>48</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/washington/05text-gates1.html>

<sup>49</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/25/washington/25transcript-bush.html>

<sup>50</sup>Gates (2014, ch.10); Saunders (2018)

<sup>51</sup>VanDeMark (2018)

<sup>52</sup>Halberstam (1972, 176)

veering too far from the party’s values.<sup>53</sup> This proposition was put to the test early on, when Bowles advocated internally against the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion; after the mission’s failure, Bowles leaked to the press his earlier memorandum opposing the decision—a move which precipitated his ultimate dismissal from his prominent post at State.<sup>54</sup>

These examples suggest that leaders have a rich set of appointment options across the two-dimensional space of ideological bias and political loyalty. When weighing their appointment options along these dimensions, leaders face a set of complex and potentially conflicting incentives. They want to induce certain behaviors from foreign actors (detering aggression, in the present model); they want to elicit the best advice to guide policymaking; and they want to maximize their domestic political standing as a result of their foreign policy conduct. To evaluate leaders’ optimal appointment strategies in light of these various incentives, we turn to our formal analysis.

## 2 Formal Model

The model examines the domestic politics within a home (“defender”) country, in the context of an international crisis against a foreign (“challenger”) country. To fix terms, we say that a crisis occurs when the foreign government takes some provocative action against the home country’s interests; given the emergence of a crisis, the home government must then choose whether or not to take a costly, retaliatory action in response. We refer to the former action as initiating a “challenge”, and the latter as either “fighting” or “conceding”.

Within the defender country are three players: a leader  $L$ , an appointee (or agent)  $A$ , and a representative voter  $V$ . The foreign government is treated as a unitary actor,  $F$ . The domestic leader is either from a Dove party ( $j = D$ ) or a Hawk party ( $j = H$ ), which is fixed at the start of the game and known by all players.


The game begins with the leader selecting his appointee, characterized by two attributes which will be described below: a bias parameter  $\pi_A^k$ , and a loyalty parameter  $\lambda$ . Following the appointment, the foreign government’s conflict valuation  $\omega_F$  is realized, and  $F$  decides whether to initiate a challenge ( $a_F = 1$ ) or not ( $a_F = 0$ ) against the home country. The home country’s conflict valuation  $\omega$  is then realized, and the appointee offers private advice to the leader in support of ( $s = 1$ ) or against ( $s = 0$ ) fighting. The leader chooses whether to fight ( $a = 1$ ) or not ( $a = 0$ ), and the appointee chooses whether to protest the leader’s decision ( $z = 1$ ) or remain silent ( $z = 0$ ).

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<sup>53</sup>Halberstam (1972, 70)

<sup>54</sup>Brooks (1965, 34), Halberstam (1972, 68)

Figure 1: Game Sequence



*Note:* Boxes above the timeline denote actions and state/type realizations; technical details are below. All aspects of the game are common knowledge unless otherwise stated.

Finally, the domestic voter chooses whether to retain the leader ( $r = 1$ ) or remove him ( $r = 0$ ) in favor of his electoral opponent. The game sequence is summarized in Figure 1.

The foreign government's incentives are specified sparsely, so as to focus attention on the domestic politics within the home country. *F* has a private valuation  $\omega_F \sim U(\underline{\omega}_F, \bar{\omega}_F)$  for the issue in dispute, where  $[0, 1] \subseteq [\underline{\omega}_F, \bar{\omega}_F]$ . They prefer to win the issue uncontested, and they incur a cost normalized to 1 if the home government fights back (or if the latter initiates conflict unprovoked). Thus *F*'s payoff is given by

$$U_F = a_F \omega_F - a \quad (1)$$

There are two sources of informational asymmetry between the domestic leader and voter. First, the leader has an informational advantage with respect to a policy-relevant state of the world,  $\omega \in \{0, 1\}$ . This variable represents, in simplified terms, the net value of engaging in conflict with the foreign adversary: taking account of the valuation of the issue, the costs of conflict, and the likelihood of success in conflict, we say that it is either in the national interest to fight ( $\omega = 1$ )

or it is not ( $\omega = 0$ ). The state  $\omega$  is drawn randomly by nature, with probability

$$Pr(\omega = 1|a_F) = \begin{cases} \tau, & a_F = 1 \\ \tau_0 < \tau, & a_F = 0 \end{cases},$$

meaning that  $F$ 's challenge serves to increase (from  $\tau_0$  to  $\tau$ ) the probability that fighting is in the home country's interest. To simplify the exposition, we will assume  $\tau_0 \rightarrow 0$ : the leader has the option to engage in unprovoked aggression, but it is very rarely in the national interest to do so.<sup>55</sup> (The main text presents results for  $\tau = \frac{1}{2}$ , but all results are more generally derived in the appendix.) The leader does not observe  $\omega$  directly, but receives a private signal  $x \in \{0, 1\}$ , with  $Pr(x = \omega|\omega) = \phi \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$  (along with the private advice given by the agent, as described below).

The second source of informational asymmetry is the leader's privately known policy preference: the leader has preferences which are either *congruent* ( $\theta = 1$ ) or *incongruent* ( $\theta = 0$ ) with those of a representative voter. The voter wants the leader to match his action to the state of the world—fighting if and only if the value of conflict is high ( $\omega = 1$ )—which we can express as

$$W_V = a\omega + (1 - a)(1 - \omega) = \mathbb{1}[a = \omega]$$

Following Schultz,<sup>56</sup> we assume that the congruent leader (alternatively referred to as a “moderate” type) shares the voter's policy preference, while the incongruent leader (“extreme” type) has a state-independent preference for taking one action over the other: an incongruent leader of the Dove party prefers conceding ( $a = 0$ ) regardless of  $\omega$ , and an incongruent Hawk prefers fighting ( $a = 1$ ) regardless of  $\omega$ . The leader knows his own type, but all other players only know the prior probability of each type,  $Pr(\theta = 1) = \pi \in [\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ . We can denote the leader's policy payoff as

$$W_L = \theta W_V + (1 - \theta) \begin{cases} 1 - a, & j = D \\ a, & j = H \end{cases}$$

In addition, the leader suffers a cost of  $\gamma > 0$  when the foreign government challenges, and enjoys an office-holding benefit of  $\beta > 0$  when the voter retains him in office. Altogether, the leader's total

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<sup>55</sup>For convenience, we will refer to the action  $a = 0$  as “conceding” or “backing down”, though this is a slight mischaracterization in the case that  $F$  does not initiate a challenge.

<sup>56</sup>Schultz (2005)



payoff is given by

$$U_L = -a_F\gamma + W_L + r\beta \quad (2)$$

The appointee, like the leader, has policy preferences which are either congruent ( $\theta_A = 1$ ), or incongruent ( $\theta_A = 0$ ) in a predictably hawkish ( $k = H$ ) or dovish ( $k = D$ ) direction. Specifically, at the appointment stage, the leader chooses  $\pi_A^k$ , which denotes the direction ( $k \in \{D, H\}$ ) and magnitude ( $\pi_A \in [0, 1]$ ) of the agent’s “bias”. After being appointed, the agent’s type  $\theta_A \in \{0, 1\}$  is realized and observed privately by  $A$ , with the commonly known probability  $Pr(\theta_A = 1) = \pi_A$ . The agent’s policy payoff is given by

$$W_A = \theta_A W_V + (1 - \theta_A) \begin{cases} 1 - a, & k = D \\ a, & k = H \end{cases}$$

The agent observes the state  $\omega$ , and offers advice to the leader in the form of a private, cheap-talk message expressing support for fighting ( $s = 1$ ) or conceding ( $s = 0$ ).

After the leader acts, the agent can either resign ( $z = 1$ ) or remain in the administration ( $z = 0$ ) (alternatively referred to as “protesting” or “remaining silent”). The agent has an “outside option” payoff of  $y \in \{\underline{y}, \bar{y}\}$ , with  $\underline{y} < 0 < \bar{y}$ ; this represents her value of leaving the administration relative to remaining, taking account of all factors other than policy concerns—income, prestige, ego rents, personal reputation, and so on. This value is observed privately by the appointee and the leader (after the appointment and before the leader’s crisis response), while the other players hold a prior belief  $Pr(y = \underline{y}) = \lambda$  (where  $\lambda$ , the appointee’s “loyalty”, is chosen by the leader at the appointment stage). The policy value of remaining in the administration is  $f_A(\theta)$ , with  $f_A(1) > f_A(0) = 0$ , reflecting the idea that serving under a congruent leader provides the appointee with greater scope for influence in future policy decisions.<sup>57</sup> Altogether, the agent’s total payoff is given by

$$U_A = W_A + zy + (1 - z)f_A(\theta) \quad (3)$$

Finally, let us consider the election stage. Upon observing the leader’s appointment decision  $\alpha = (\pi_A^k, \lambda)$ , the foreign government’s action  $a_F$ , the leader’s action  $a$ , and the appointee’s action  $z$ , the voter forms a posterior belief of the leader’s quality,  $\mu^h = Pr(\theta = 1|h)$  for history  $h$ . The leader is then reelected (denoted  $r = 1$ ) with probability  $\mu^h$ , and with complementary probability

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<sup>57</sup>See discussion in Appendix 8.1.

$1 - \mu^h$  he is removed from office ( $r = 0$ ) in favor of his electoral opponent.<sup>58</sup>

For reference, all parameters and variables are listed in Table A4. The solution concept employed throughout is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (henceforth “equilibrium”). Technical assumptions regarding parameter restrictions and equilibrium refinements are discussed in Appendix 7.

### 3 Analysis

Before proceeding with the substantive analysis of the game, we will begin by pinning down a number of preliminary concepts that we will build upon going forward.

It will be useful to divide the game into three stages: 1) the appointment stage, 2) the crisis subgame (the subgame following  $F$ 's action of  $a_F = 1$ ), and 3) the non-crisis subgame (the subgame following  $F$ 's action of  $a_F = 0$ ).

Behavior in the non-crisis subgame is straightforward, with a formal characterization given in the Appendix. All Dove leaders, and moderate Hawk leaders, do not fight when unprovoked. Extreme Hawks may initiate unprovoked aggression, with a probability that is (weakly) decreasing in the strength of electoral incentives (and thus in the value of mimicking a moderate Hawk). In all cases, the leader's behavior in the absence of a crisis is unaffected by the appointment, so the bulk of the analysis focuses on the crisis subgame.

Within the crisis subgame, let us first consider the agent's strategy in providing private advice to the leader. Because the agent's advice takes the form of a cheap-talk message, many reporting strategies are available in principle. The most intuitive strategy, and the one we will focus on throughout the analysis, is as follows:

**Definition 1 (Sincere reporting strategy)** *We say that the agent plays a **sincere** reporting*

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<sup>58</sup>We can microfound this election process as follows. Suppose the voter faces the choice between a challenger  $C$  and the incumbent  $L$ , where  $C$  has a type  $\theta_C \in \{0, 1\}$  with  $Pr(\theta_C = 1) = \pi_C$ .  $V$ 's payoff from retaining ( $r = 1$ ) or replacing ( $r = 0$ ) the leader is given by

$$U_V = r\theta + (1 - r)(\theta_C + \varepsilon),$$

where  $\varepsilon$  captures  $V$ 's preferences on all dimensions other than foreign policy, with  $\varepsilon \sim U(\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon})$  and  $[-\pi_C, 1 - \pi_C] \subseteq [\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon}]$ . Under this alternative setup with a strategic voter and with  $[\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon}] = [-\pi_C, 1 - \pi_C]$ , any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to the game features  $V$  reelecting with probability equal to  $\mu^h$ . Further, note that the bounds of  $[\underline{\varepsilon}, \bar{\varepsilon}]$  can be varied to allow for partisan asymmetry in voter preferences, incumbency (dis)advantage, and variation in the salience of foreign policy in the voter's electoral decision; these changes do not alter the strategic incentives characterized below.

strategy when she provides advice to  $L$  that reflects her true policy preferences: that is,

$$s = \hat{\omega}_A := \begin{cases} \omega, & \theta_A = 1 \\ 1, & \theta_A = 0 \text{ \& } k = H \\ 0, & \theta_A = 0 \text{ \& } k = D \end{cases}$$

From the perspective of the other players, who know  $\pi_A^k$  but not  $\theta_A$ , a sincere reporting strategy generates advice that satisfies

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Pr(s = 1 | \omega = 0) = 0 \\ Pr(s = 1 | \omega = 1) = \pi_A \end{array} \right\} \text{ if } k = D, \text{ and } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} Pr(s = 1 | \omega = 0) = 1 - \pi_A \\ Pr(s = 1 | \omega = 1) = 1 \end{array} \right\} \text{ if } k = H$$

We can then define the equilibrium of interest in the crisis subgame:

**Definition 2 (Congruent-Responsive Equilibrium)** *Define the **Congruent-Responsive Equilibrium (CRE)** as the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to the crisis subgame in which the congruent leader attempts to match his action to the state: that is,*

$$\sigma_1^{x,s} = Pr(a = 1 | \theta = 1, x, s) = \begin{cases} 1, & Pr(\omega = 1 | x, s) \geq \frac{1}{2} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

In Appendix 7, we introduce a number of technical assumptions regarding off-path beliefs and equilibrium selection. The most consequential among these is that we select the CRE with sincere reporting whenever it is available. Intuitively, this restriction focuses our attention on the equilibrium that maximizes information transmission between the advisor and leader, and that maximizes the policy payoffs for both congruent and incongruent leaders. With these assumptions imposed, we can state the following:<sup>59</sup>

**Proposition 1** *A Congruent-Responsive Equilibrium (CRE) to the crisis subgame always exists. At the appointment stage, the leader always selects an appointee whose sincere advice can be followed in a CRE.*

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<sup>59</sup>This proposition, and subsequent formal results, invoke the parameter restrictions stated in Assumption 1.

The remainder of the analysis focuses on equilibrium behavior within a CRE in which the agent reports sincerely and the congruent leader follows the agent’s advice.

A core quantity of interest through the analysis is the appointee’s influence, which we can define formally as follows:

**Definition 3 (Appointee Influence)** *Define the appointee’s **influence** on policy as: the probability that  $L$ ’s crisis action with the appointee differs from what it would be without the appointee in place.*<sup>60</sup>

This definition allows us to quantify precisely the extent to which the appointment impacts the leader’s foreign policy behavior, and how that impact varies as a function of appointee attributes and exogenous parameters.

### 3.1 Benchmark Model Without Domestic Politics

To build intuition for the main results, we begin by analyzing a simplified version of the model in which the leader’s quality is common knowledge.<sup>61</sup> We will refer to this variant as the game without domestic politics: because the voter is forward-looking, her electoral decision is fully determined by her knowledge of the leader’s congruence  $\theta$  and is thus unaffected by any action taken by the other players. This benchmark model effectively shuts down the fire-alarm mechanism and restricts attention to the advisory mechanism.

**Result 1 (Game without domestic politics)** *Consider a variant of the full model where  $L$ ’s type is common knowledge, taking the appointee’s attributes as given.*

- $F$  is less likely to challenge a moderate leader than an extreme leader of either party.
- When facing a congruent leader of either party,  $F$ ’s likelihood of challenging is decreasing in the appointee’s hawkishness.
- Given a challenge from  $F$ :
  - The congruent leader follows the agent’s advice, and the incongruent leader ignores it and plays his ideologically-preferred action: that is, extreme Hawks always fight, and extreme Doves always concede.
  - The appointee’s influence is given by  $\frac{\pi}{2}(1 - \pi_A(2\phi - 1))$ , which is increasing in her own bias, decreasing in the leader’s expertise, and limited to congruent leaders.

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<sup>60</sup>More precisely, the comparison is between  $L$ ’s CRE action when the appointee plays a sincere reporting strategy, versus when the appointee babbles.

<sup>61</sup>Formally, we can think of this as a special case of the model in which either  $\pi \rightarrow 0$  or  $\pi \rightarrow 1$ .

Absent any electoral considerations, each leader type takes the action they prefer for policy reasons alone. For extreme leaders, this simply means taking their ideologically-consistent action: extreme Hawks always fight, and extreme Doves never fight. In the language of principal-agent models, the extreme leader always “shirks” his responsibility to govern in the voter’s interest,<sup>62</sup> as he has no incentive to do otherwise.

For moderate leaders, however, their preference is more complicated: they wish to fight if and only if it is in the voter’s interest to do so (that is, when  $\omega = 1$ ), but they face uncertainty as to the true state of the world. In navigating that uncertainty, a moderate leader can draw on two sources of information: his own noisy but unbiased signal  $x$ , and his agent’s more accurate but potentially biased signal  $s$ . In the event that the two conflict, the leader will follow the agent’s advice if her bias is bounded relative to the leader’s own expertise—a condition that we define in the appendix as the agent being *informative*. In equilibrium, the congruent leader always selects an informative appointee, so he always does better by following her advice once a crisis arises.

Given this crisis behavior by each leader, it is straightforward to quantify the appointee’s influence over policy: the appointee can only influence the congruent leader’s behavior, and only by providing him with advice that differs from whatever his private information would have led him to do otherwise. The probability of this happening is decreasing in the precision of the leader’s private signal (that is, his expertise  $\phi$ ), and increasing in the appointee’s bias.

The extreme leaders’ unresponsiveness to the underlying state  $\omega$  has important implications for deterrence. Let  $\hat{a}(\alpha)$  denote the probability that  $L$  fights back when challenged, given appointment  $\alpha = (\pi_A^k, \lambda)$ ; and let  $\hat{a}_0$  denote the probability that  $L$  fights even when  $F$  does not initiate a challenge.<sup>63</sup> It follows directly from  $F$ ’s payoff function that they will challenge if and only if  $\omega_F > \hat{a}(\alpha) - \hat{a}_0$ , or in words, if

$$F\text{'s resolve} > \Pr(L \text{ fight} | F \text{ challenge}, \alpha) - \Pr(L \text{ fight} | F \text{ not challenge})$$

The standard logic of deterrence relies on establishing, in the mind of the challenger, a link between the challenger’s provocative action and an adverse consequence of that action. When the domestic leader is incongruent, that link is broken. In the absence of electoral incentives, incongruent leaders of either party are unresponsive to the policy value of fighting, and thus unresponsive to  $F$ ’s decision to initiate a challenge or not. (Formally, for incongruent leaders,  $\hat{a}(\alpha) = \hat{a}_0$  for all  $\alpha$ .) This creates

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<sup>62</sup>Fearon (1999)

<sup>63</sup>Note that  $\hat{a}_0$  does not depend on  $\alpha$ , given the assumption that  $\tau_0 = \Pr(\omega = 1 | a_F = 0)$  is arbitrarily small.

the weakest possible disincentive against  $F$  challenging.

In contrast, when facing a congruent leader,  $F$  understands that only their own aggression can provoke a hostile response from  $L$ . (That is,  $\hat{a}_0 = 0$  for a congruent leader.) The higher the expectation that  $F$ 's aggression will be retaliated against (that is, the higher is  $\hat{a}(\alpha)$ ), the greater the disincentive against  $F$  challenging in the first place. Because the congruent leader follows his appointee's advice, he can credibly enhance deterrence by selecting a hawkishly-biased appointee who shades her advice in favor of fighting when a crisis arises.

The model without domestic politics provides a useful benchmark against which to compare the full model, and to demonstrate how electoral incentives open up a new channel of appointee influence. It also clarifies an important point regarding the leader's incentives at the appointment stage of the full model: because revealing oneself to be incongruent at the appointment stage yields the worst deterrent against  $F$ 's aggression, and because it yields the worst electoral prospects, an incongruent leader must fully mimic a congruent leader's appointment strategy. As a result, we may observe appointees serving under an extreme leader, whom the latter would prefer not to have in office *ex post* but could not avoid appointing *ex ante*.

### 3.2 Full Model: How Appointees Influence Crisis Behavior

We can now expand the analysis to incorporate domestic politics. As originally stated in the model setup, we now assume that the leader's quality  $\theta$  is his own private information, with all other players holding a common prior belief  $Pr(\theta = 1) = \pi \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ . This section will analyze the "crisis subgame"—the subgame following  $F$ 's decision to initiate a challenge—taking the appointee attributes as given. After analyzing the appointee's impact within the crisis subgame, we will then proceed to examine the leader's optimal appointment strategy.

The following result summarizes the crisis subgame equilibrium, focusing on the case of the Dove leader; results for the Hawk leader are symmetrical (simply switching the preferred action of the incongruent leader).

**Result 2 (Crisis subgame)** *Consider the full model, with a Dove leader in office, taking the appointee's attributes as given. On the equilibrium path of play, given a challenge from  $F$ :*

- *The congruent leader always follows the agent's advice.*
- *When the agent advises fighting, the incongruent leader follows that advice with a probability that is (weakly) increasing in (i) the appointee's independence, and (ii) the strength of electoral*

incentives (as per Equation 4).

- The voter rewards the leader for fighting relative to conceding, and maximally punishes the leader when the appointee protests.

The appointee’s influence is given by  $\frac{\pi}{2}(1 - \pi_A(2\phi - 1)) + (1 - \pi)\sigma_A\sigma_0^1$ , where  $\sigma_A = Pr(s = 1)$  is given by (5) and  $\sigma_0^1$  is given by (4).

- Appointee influence is decreasing in the leader’s expertise, (weakly) increasing in his electoral incentives, (weakly) increasing in the appointee’s independence, and increasing in her hawkishness for  $\pi_A^H \leq 1$ .

Results under a Hawk leader are symmetrical.

As in the benchmark model, the moderate leader remains incentivized to follow the agent’s advice. The leader is aware of the agent’s bias, and knows that she may be recommending action that the leader would not pursue if he had access to the same information that the agent has; but the leader still determines that he is better off, on balance, following her advice rather than disregarding it, because the benefit of her expertise outweighs the cost of her bias. Thus the first term in the value of appointee influence,  $\frac{\pi}{2}(1 - \pi_A(2\phi - 1))$ , remains as it was in the benchmark model.

In the benchmark, the extreme leader faced no incentive to take action contrary to his true policy preference. With the introduction of domestic politics, however, the extreme Dove confronts a tradeoff: he prefers a conciliatory policy response for ideological reasons, but taking that action may reveal his incongruence to the voters and harm his reelection prospects. How he navigates this tradeoff depends on the strength of his electoral incentives and the political loyalty of his appointee. Specifically, recall that the appointee faces an “outside option” value of  $y \in \{\underline{y}, \bar{y}\}$  (where  $\underline{y} < 0 < \bar{y}$ ), which she compares against her value of continued service  $f_A(\theta)$  (where  $f_A(1) > f_A(0) = 0$ ). Intuitively, the agent is more likely to remain in the administration when she believes the leader is more likely to be congruent, and thus receptive to her policy advice in the future.

When the agent recommends conceding, the extreme leader faces no tradeoff: his preferred action is conveniently the one that will elicit no protest from his appointee. Likewise, when the agent recommends fighting but has a low outside option value ( $y = \underline{y}$ ), the extreme leader’s decision is easy: he knows that if he takes a conciliatory action in the crisis, the appointee will disagree with that decision, but she will not make her disagreements known to an audience who can hold the leader accountable. However, when the agent’s outside option is high—meaning she is willing to

publicly protest the leader’s decision—her recommendation to fight pits the leader’s policy interests against his political concerns: he is ideologically inclined toward conceding, but doing so will invite politically damaging public criticism from within his own administration.

Why would voters punish the leader upon observing internal policy disagreements aired out publicly? Fundamentally, the voter’s responsiveness to the appointee’s protest depends on two factors: the alignment of interest between the voter and appointee with respect to the leader’s quality, and the appointee’s insider information. Appointees want to serve under congruent leaders, who are intrinsically motivated to follow their appointees’ expert advice; voters want to retain congruent leaders, who are intrinsically motivated to set policies that match the voters’ preference. The appointee’s willingness to resign in protest, or to otherwise criticize the leader and risk her future standing in the administration, reflects her assessment that continued service in the administration is of little value—due to the leader’s unwillingness to make use of expertise. Because this assessment is informed by the appointee’s insider knowledge of internal policy deliberations, the voters rationally incorporate the appointee’s protest into their own assessment of the leader’s quality, and hence into their electoral decision.

Anticipating this electoral penalty as a result of public protest by the appointee, the incongruent leader must decide whether to endure that cost, or to instead forgo his preferred policy in order to maintain public approval. As we derive in the appendix, the best response to this dilemma gives rise to behavior which we can characterize as:

$$\sigma_0^1 = Pr(a = 1 | \theta = 0, s = 1) = \max \left\{ 0, \min \left\{ 1 - \lambda, \frac{\pi(\beta - 1)}{1 - \pi} \right\} \right\} \quad (4)$$

Intuitively, the extreme Dove leader follows the agent’s advice to fight with a probability that is (weakly) increasing in the agent’s independence ( $1 - \lambda$ ) and in the strength of his own electoral incentives ( $\beta$ ): when the agent is more likely to make her disagreements known to the public, and when the leader is more sensitive to the costs of public disapproval, he is more likely to accommodate the agent’s policy concerns so as to preempt any electoral punishment. If electoral incentives are sufficiently large ( $\beta > 1$ ) and the appointee is not fully loyal ( $\lambda < 1$ ), then the appointee’s influence on policy is strictly greater than it was in the benchmark model without domestic politics (by the amount of  $(1 - \pi)\sigma_A\sigma_0^1$ , as stated in Result 2).



### 3.3 Implications for Deterrence and Voter Welfare

Having formally articulated the mechanisms through which appointees can influence leaders' behavior, we can proceed to assess their impact on a number of substantively and normatively important political outcomes. We will consider three in particular: deterrence, policy responsiveness, and electoral selection. For convenience, denote an appointment profile as  $\alpha = (\pi_A^k, \lambda)$ .

*Deterrence.* Let  $\hat{a}(\alpha)$  denote, from  $F$ 's perspective, the equilibrium probability of the domestic leader fighting back when challenged, given appointment  $\alpha$ ; and likewise, let  $\hat{a}_0$  denote the probability of the leader initiating conflict unprovoked. Recall from the discussion surrounding Result 1 that  $F$  challenges if and only if their resolve  $\omega_F$  is greater than  $\hat{a}(\alpha) - \hat{a}_0$ , where  $\hat{a}(\alpha)$  varies as a function of appointee attributes but  $\hat{a}_0$  does not. Thus we can say that an appointment improves deterrence if it increases  $\hat{a}(\alpha)$ , which discourages  $F$  from initiating a challenge.

*Responsiveness.* An appointment improves policy responsiveness if it increases the probability that, conditional on a challenge from  $F$ , the leader's action matches the state of the world: that is, the appointment increases  $E[W_V|a_F = 1] = Pr(a = \omega|a_F = 1)$ . Responsiveness is undermined when the extreme leader shirks his responsibility to the voter, or when either leader seeks to serve the voter's interest but errs due to incorrect beliefs about the state.

*Selection.* An appointment improves electoral selection if it increases the difference between the reelection rates of congruent and incongruent leaders. We can measure electoral selection, conditional on appointment  $\alpha$  and the emerge of a crisis, as

$$\Delta_r(\alpha) = E[r|\theta = 1, a_F = 1, \alpha] - E[r|\theta = 0, a_F = 1, \alpha]$$

Intuitively, voters wish to retain congruent leaders and remove incongruent leaders, in the face of uncertainty over the leader's true quality; the electoral selection metric quantifies the extent to which they are able to achieve this goal.

Let us first consider the appointee's effect on deterrence:

**Result 3 (Deterrence)** *Under a Dove leader:*

- *The likelihood of  $F$  challenging is decreasing in the appointee's hawkishness and (weakly) decreasing in her independence.*

*Under a Hawk leader:*

- *The likelihood of  $F$  challenging is decreasing in the appointee’s hawkishness and (weakly) increasing in her independence.*

The basic logic of deterrence in the case of the Dove leader was outlined in the context of Results 1 and 2. As the appointee becomes more hawkish, she is more likely to induce the leader to fight via the advisory mechanism. The impact of her advice is further amplified when accompanied by the fire-alarm mechanism, which pressures extreme Doves to fight when they otherwise would not. Thus we can see that hawkishness and independence have complementary effects on deterrence.

The advisory mechanism operates in equal measure under a Hawk leader, likewise serving to enhance deterrence. The fire-alarm mechanism, however, works in the opposite direction. Under a Dove leader, the moral hazard problem between the voter and incongruent leader implies that the leader fights less often than the voter would want to, if the voter were in the leader’s position; the threat of the fire alarm disciplines the leader into governing more in line with the voter’s interest, by fighting more frequently. Under a Hawk leader, in contrast, the moral hazard problem implies an excessive combativeness on the global stage—entering into conflicts where the voter would prefer to stay out, if fully appraised of the expected costs and benefits. Mitigating this form of moral hazard, though desirable for the voters ex post (after a crisis has arisen), has the unfortunate effect of undermining deterrence ex ante.


While some appointments can enhance deterrence against foreign aggression, the next result demonstrates that there is inevitably an offsetting cost:

**Result 4 (Welfare implications)** *Consider a fully loyal and unbiased appointee,  $\pi_A = \lambda = 1$ . Any marginal change in appointee bias or loyalty that improves deterrence must weaken either policy responsiveness, or electoral selection, or both.*

The result is fairly straightforward when considering the effect of appointee bias on policy responsiveness. In order for the agent’s hawkishness to improve deterrence, it must be the case that she induces the leader to fight in some instances where he (and the voter) would prefer not to, were they themselves privy to the same information that the agent observed. This distortionary effect on policy is core to the deterrent logic of the advisory mechanism.

The effects of appointee bias on deterrence and responsiveness under a Dove leader are depicted in the lefthand panel of Figure 2. Both the congruent and incongruent leaders’ fighting probabilities are increasing linearly in the appointee’s hawkishness, with the incongruent leader’s strategy responding at a slower rate (given  $0 < \lambda < 1$ , as is the case in the figure). Deterrence is simply

Figure 2: Effects of Appointee Bias, under a Dove Leader




a weighted average of the congruent and incongruent leader’s fighting probabilities, reflecting the foreign challenger’s uncertainty as to which type of domestic leader they are facing. Policy responsiveness peaks in the center of the figure, when the agent’s advice is perfectly unbiased ( $\pi_A = 1$ ), and decreases with the agent’s bias in either direction.

The effect of appointee hawkishness on electoral selection is more subtle, operating through both a direct effect on leader behavior, and an indirect effect on voters’ beliefs. The righthand panel of Figure 2 depicts these effects in the case of a Dove leader. As the appointee becomes more hawkish, this leads the moderate leader to fight more frequently, creating greater separation in the behavior of the two leader types (increasing  $Pr(a = 1 | \theta = 1) - Pr(a = 1 | \theta = 0)$ ). This in turn leads voters to assess the leader more negatively when they see him concede in the crisis (decreasing  $Pr(\theta = 1 | a = 0)$ ). These effects combine to make voters better able to distinguish moderate Doves from extreme Doves, thus improving electoral selection.

Under a Hawk leader, however, appointee hawkishness induces convergence rather than separation in the behavior of extremists and moderates. The only way for Hawk leaders to improve deterrence is by appointing a hawkishly biased agent, but doing so undermines both policy responsiveness and electoral selection.

Figure 3: Effects of Appointee Independence, under a Dove Leader



In addition to appointee hawkishness, the Dove leader can also improve deterrence through appointee independence, which activates the fire-alarm mechanism. As discussed above, this mechanism improves deterrence through its effect on the incongruent leader’s behavior; and by pressuring the incongruent leader to fight more often than he otherwise would, the appointee improves policy responsiveness along with deterrence. We see this effect depicted in the solid line in Figure 3. However, as the incongruent leader is induced to behave more like the congruent leader, the voter becomes less able to differentiate the two. Electoral selection is weakened as a consequence, as depicted in the dashed line.<sup>64</sup>

### 3.4 Leader’s Optimal Appointment Strategy

Having examined the various effects that appointees can have on foreign policy and domestic politics once in office, as summarized in Table 1, we can now turn to the question of which appointee the leader will optimally select. Two preliminary points are worth noting. First, as discussed above, the incongruent leaders of both parties are incentivized to fully mimic the appointment strategy of their congruent counterparts. Second, each outcome discussed in the preceding section—deterrence, policy responsiveness, and electoral selection—corresponds to a goal that the congruent leader wishes to advance through his appointment strategy (the terms  $-a_F\gamma$ ,  $W_L$ , and  $r\beta$ , respectively, in the leader’s payoff function (2)). Thus the equilibrium appointment will be the one that best serves

<sup>64</sup>Electoral selection is weakened as loyalty decreases from  $\lambda = 1$  down to  $\bar{\lambda} = \frac{1-\beta\pi}{1-\pi}$ . As  $\lambda$  decreases beyond that point, the direct effect of the appointee’s increased willingness to protest dominates the indirect effect of altering the incongruent leader’s behavior, and selection begins to increase. Note that  $\bar{\lambda}$  is decreasing in  $\beta$ ; for sufficiently small  $\beta$ , electoral selection is greater with  $\lambda = 0$  than with  $\lambda = 1$ .

Table 1: Effects of Appointee Hawkishness and Independence

<u>Dove Leader</u>	Deterrence $Pr(a = 1)$	Responsiveness $Pr(a = \omega)$	Electoral Selection $E[r \theta = 1] - E[r \theta = 0]$
Hawkishly Biased ( $\pi_A^H < 1$ )	↑	↓	↑
Dovishly Biased ( $\pi_A^D < 1$ )	↓	↓	↓
Politically Independent ( $\lambda < 1$ )	↑	↑	↓

<u>Hawk Leader</u>	Deterrence $Pr(a = 1)$	Responsiveness $Pr(a = \omega)$	Electoral Selection $E[r \theta = 1] - E[r \theta = 0]$
Hawkishly Biased ( $\pi_A^H < 1$ )	↑	↓	↓
Dovishly Biased ( $\pi_A^D < 1$ )	↓	↓	↑
Politically Independent ( $\lambda < 1$ )	↓	↑	↓

*Note:* All changes relative to an unbiased and fully loyal appointee ( $\pi_A = \lambda = 1$ ).

the congruent leader’s interests, taking account of the tradeoffs among these three objectives.

We have the following result with respect to appointee bias:

**Result 5 (Biased Appointments)**

- *Leaders of either party will never appoint a dovishly-biased agent.*
- *Leaders of either party will appoint a hawkishly biased agent if the value of deterrence is high.*
- *More experienced leaders are less likely to appoint biased agents.*

The first point is straightforward: dovishly-biased agents clearly offer no benefit to a Dove leader, and while they may benefit Hawk leaders electorally, that benefit is always outweighed by the costs of distorting policy and weakening deterrence. In contrast, hawkishly-biased agents can prove optimal for a leader of either party: though a hawkish agent distorts policy responsiveness, and may (for a Hawk leader) harm reelection prospects, a leader of either party is willing to incur these costs if they place sufficient value on deterring foreign aggression.

We also uncover a more nuanced result regarding leader experience (insofar as experience is reflected in the leader’s “expertise”,<sup>65</sup> or the accuracy of the leader’s private signal  $\phi$ ). In order for the appointee to influence policy through the advisory mechanism, it must be credible for the leader to follow advice that he knows to be biased; this requires that the cost of the bias be offset by the benefit of the agent’s expertise—and in particular, the difference between the agent’s expertise and the leader’s own. More experienced leaders are less able to credibly commit to being influenced

<sup>65</sup>Saunders (2017, S224)

by biased advice, and thus have less utility for biased appointments.

Turning to appointee independence, we find the following:

**Result 6 (Independent Appointments)**

- *A Dove leader will appoint an independent agent if the value of deterrence is high.*
- *Leaders of either party will appoint an independent agent if (and only if) electoral incentives are low.*
- *A Hawk leader may appoint an independent agent, even when doing so will undermine deterrence; but he is less likely than a Dove leader to appoint an independent agent (under otherwise symmetrical conditions).*

While Dove leaders may optimally appoint independent agents under a broad range of conditions, their reason for doing so will differ depending on the strength of electoral incentives,  $\beta$ . Counterintuitively, Dove leaders select independent appointees for their electoral benefits precisely when electoral incentives are low. When  $\beta < 1$ , an independent appointee will not affect the incongruent leader’s behavior, and therefore cannot improve deterrence; but she can help the congruent leader’s reelection prospects, as her decision not to protest can provide “political cover”—validating actions by the leader which would otherwise be viewed unfavorably by the voter. Conversely, when electoral incentives are high, the motive for selecting an independent agent is purely its deterrent value: when  $\beta > \frac{1}{\pi}$ , the appointee’s independence induces the extreme leader to fully mimic a moderate, thus improving deterrence but undercutting the moderate’s electoral advantage as a consequence. It is only under a fairly narrow range of conditions<sup>66</sup> that an independent appointee can advance both electoral and deterrent objectives simultaneously.

The effect of electoral incentives on the Hawk’s appointment strategy follows a similar logic. Independent appointees are always desirable when they don’t affect the incongruent leader’s behavior. As electoral incentives increase, and the threat of appointee protest starts to induce moderation in the extreme Hawk’s behavior, appointee independence becomes less valuable for the congruent Hawk. Somewhat surprisingly, this logic implies that congruent Hawks may still be willing to suffer some diminution of deterrence in exchange for the electoral benefits that an independent appointee provides. Yet ultimately we do find that Doves are more willing than Hawks to appoint independent agents, and this divergence in appointment preferences grows as the value of deterrence increases.

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<sup>66</sup>Specifically, when  $\beta \in (1, \hat{\beta})$ , for some  $\hat{\beta} \in (1, \frac{1}{\pi})$

Table 2: U.S. Defense Secretary Appointments by Party, 1947–2023

	Democrat	Republican
Total years of administration	36	40
Years of cross-party appointment	17	0
Years of non-partisan appointment	7	2
Years of own-party appointment	12	38
Years of own-party, partisan appointment	3	25

*Note:* See Table A5 for details.

## 4 Empirical Implications: Partisan Asymmetry in Appointments

To assess the empirical plausibility of the theory’s implications, we can consider some descriptive patterns of partisan appointments in top-level foreign policy positions.

The incentives and institutional arrangements assumed in the theory are most directly modeled after the postwar U.S. presidency, and this appears to be a context in which the theory provides considerable empirical purchase. Table 2 presents a striking pattern: since the creation of the office of the U.S. secretary of defense in 1947, Democratic presidents have filled the position with a Republican appointee for roughly half of their 36 years in office. No Democrat has been appointed to the position in 40 years of Republican administration. “Partisan” Democrats—those who previously held elected office or worked in party politics—served in the role for only 3 of Democrats’ 36 years; the analogous figure for partisan Republicans is 25 of 40 years.

The model presented here provides a framework to help make sense of this asymmetry. Considering Democrats and Republicans to represent the Dove and Hawk parties, respectively, a central implication of the model is that neither Democrats nor Republicans will ever appoint dovishly-biased agents to high-level national security positions; that both have an incentive to appoint hawkishly-biased agents; and that Democrats are more likely than are Republicans to prefer appointees with weak political loyalties to themselves. Each of these tendencies is borne out in the data. The appendix provides further discussion of several cases of co-partisan appointments that also seem to fit the logic of the model—Democratic appointees who were perceived as more hawkish than their co-partisan presidents—as well as a number of other high-profile appointments to different foreign policy positions.

To examine whether these patterns also appear beyond the context of the United States, we turn to two cross-national datasets: the WhoGov dataset,<sup>67</sup> which records the portfolios and party

<sup>67</sup>Nyrup and Bramwell (2020)

Table 3: Defense Minister Partisanship Across Countries

Minister of Defense	Leader Party		Hawk Leader		Dove Leader	
	Hawk	Dove	Up for Reelection in Next 2 Years?			
			No	Yes	No	Yes
Hawk Party	76%	26%	74%	78%	29%	22%
Dove Party	14%	63%	14%	14%	61%	65%
Independent	6%	15%	9%	3%	18%	11%
Leader's Party	64%	48%	57%	71%	43%	54%
	(n=607)	(n=395)	(n=303)	(n=304)	(n=219)	(n=176)

*Note:* Country-year observations, across 50 countries from 1966–2018, excluding the U.S. See Appendix 10.2 for sample composition and coding details.

affiliations of the global sample of leaders and cabinet members at an annual frequency; and the Manifesto Project,<sup>68</sup> which codes time-vary party positions on a wide range of policy issues for all major parties in over 50 presidential and parliamentary democracies.<sup>69</sup> Linking these data sources, we can assign measures of hawkishness or dovishness to leaders and cabinet ministers based on their party affiliations, for 1,532 country-year observations from 1966–2018. Here we present the findings for defense ministers; similar results for foreign affairs ministers are reported in Appendix 10.2.

The first two columns of Table 3 break down the appointments by the leader's party image. The first two rows show, unsurprisingly, that co-partisan appointments are the most common type. Yet we also see important heterogeneity across parties: Dove leaders are nearly twice as likely to appoint Hawk defense ministers than the reverse (26% vs. 14%); more than twice as likely as Hawk leaders to appoint independent, non-partisan defense ministers (15% vs. 6%); and substantially less likely to appoint co-partisans (48% vs. 64%).<sup>70</sup>

The next four columns consider temporal heterogeneity in appointment strategies. Result 6 stated that leaders of either party will be less likely to appoint politically independent agents when electoral incentives are large. One intuitive proxy for the strength of electoral incentives is the proximity of an upcoming election in which the incumbent leader is eligible for reelection. Columns 3 and 4 split the sample of Hawk leaders, on the basis of whether the leader is facing reelection within the next two years, while Columns 5 and 6 do the same for Dove leaders.<sup>71</sup> A consistent

<sup>68</sup>Volkens, Burst, Krause, Lehmann, Matthieß, Regel, Weßels, and Zehnter (2021)

<sup>69</sup>See Appendix 10.2 for details.

<sup>70</sup>Note that in multiparty systems, a Dove leader may appoint a Dove minister who is not a co-partisan (and likewise for Hawks).

<sup>71</sup>Election data come from the NELDA dataset (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). Results are similar when only considering election in the next year (rather than two years), and when restricting attention to regularly-scheduled elections.



pattern emerges: leaders are more likely to select co-partisan appointees, and less likely to select independent or cross-partisan appointees, when reelection concerns are more salient. It is worth noting that the logic underlying this pattern, according to our theory, is not that leaders are afraid of independent agents revealing unfavorable information to the public in the run-up to an election; rather, it is that leaders anticipate that they will not receive full “credit” in the eyes of the voter for their moderate policy choices, if voters perceive that those choices were strongly influenced by the presence of an independent appointee. When surrounded by loyalists, a leader’s governing behavior provides a clearer signal of his true policy preferences.

These cross-national descriptive patterns are largely consistent with the model’s implications. Further research is needed, however, to determine the extent to which the theoretical mechanisms posited in the model are operative across the diverse contexts represented in the sample. In particular, it should be recognized that portfolio allocations in parliamentary coalition governments are the result of bargaining processes which are far more complex than the unilateral appointment decision modeled here—and conversely, that parliamentary cabinets are characterized by a more straightforward and credible delegation of policy authority as compared to presidential appointments.<sup>72</sup> The present theory may still help to explain why portfolio allocations with hawkish parties in charge of defense ministries would provide an efficient solution to the coalition government formation problem, and it can provide insights into how such allocations affect foreign policy and domestic politics.

## 5 Discussion

This study set out to explain how leaders select their top-level foreign policy appointees. We develop a theoretical model that incorporates the most pressing considerations that factor into the leader’s decision—the quality of policy advice he receives, the voter’s assessment of his foreign policy performance, and the impacts on foreign actors’ behavior—to understand how the leader evaluates tradeoffs in his appointment strategy. We provide cross-national evidence of appointment patterns consistent with the model’s predictions.

As in any theoretical model, the present analysis invokes a number of simplifying assumptions; future work should seek to revise and generalize some of these assumptions. Most notable, perhaps, is the present’s model focus on a single appointee; in reality, of course, leaders appoint and consult

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<sup>72</sup>Laver and Shepsle (1996)

with larger teams of foreign policy advisors, and the dynamics and disagreements among these multiple advisors have been a subject of sustained theoretical interest.<sup>73</sup> The complexity of the current analysis suggests the value of beginning with the single-appointee case and building up from there. We might also question the present model’s focus on an international game of deterrence. While deterrence has long been a central pillar of U.S. national security strategy, many foreign policy issues are better represented by other basic games at the international level (for instance, games of “prisoner’s dilemma” or “stag hunt”, rather than “chicken”).<sup>74</sup> Future work can consider how these different international games might map on to different foreign policy positions, and how that heterogeneity can explain leaders’ appointment strategies across those different positions.

Finally, we can consider other implications of the present model that future work can seek to test empirically. On the one hand, the model’s implications regarding citizen welfare (i.e. appointees’ impacts on policy responsiveness and electoral selection) involve theoretical quantities which, though normatively and politically important, are fundamentally unobservable and thus untestable. The implications regarding deterrence would seem to lend themselves more naturally to systematic empirical evaluation: Result 3 provides straightforward predictions relating appointee bias and independence to deterrence against foreign aggression, which could be tested using conventional conflict datasets. On further consideration, however, some major difficulties arise with this approach. Results 5 and 6 tell us that the likelihood of a leader selecting a deterrence-enhancing (or deterrence-undermining) appointee is a direct function of the cost they suffer from deterrence failure. If, for instance, a leader’s (unobservable) perception of a higher international threat environment affects both the leader’s choice to select a hawkish appointee, and the likelihood of a challenge occurring, then any observed correlation (either in the same or the opposite direction as predicted in Result 3) could be entirely spurious. Future work might seek to develop research designs that leverage domestically-originating sources of variation in appointments to identify their effects on foreign policy outcomes.

An alternative approach for finding evidence of appointees’ impacts on deterrence could involve qualitative examination of the internal deliberations and decision-making processes of foreign governments, and whether and how they incorporate considerations of an appointee’s attributes and influence into their assessment of her government’s behavior. Some preliminary observations suggest that such an approach may prove fruitful. Archival records and journalistic accounts, for

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<sup>73</sup>George (1972); Saunders (2017); Jost et al. (2022)

<sup>74</sup>Jervis (1978)

instance, indicate that foreign governments are keenly attuned to the particular experiences, priorities, capabilities, and ideological leanings of individual high-level appointees in the U.S.; that they have fairly sophisticated understandings of the internal workings of the U.S. foreign policy process, and the points of conflict between and within the different agencies involved; and that they form expectations of future U.S. foreign policy behavior on the basis of that knowledge.<sup>75</sup> Finding evidence linking these assessments to deterrence success or failure is an important task that we hope will be taken up in future research.

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<sup>75</sup>Schwartz (1978); Grant (1980); Whitney (1996); <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v05/d87>. See Lindsey (2023) for analogous evidence of U.S. assessments of foreign officials.

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