Hometown Economic Ties and the Appointment of Chinese Ambassadors

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University of Houston
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
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

Question:

- How does China use its diplomatic tools & diplomatic personnel to advance its foreign policy objectives?
- What can we learn about China's objectives, from observing its diplomatic appointments?

Preview of Results

Analyzing Chinese ambassadorial appointments and city-level trade, 2002–2016:

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- China is more likely to appoint an ambassador to a country when that ambassador's hometown *imports* from the country
- But no relationship between hometown *exports* and appointment

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- But no relationship between hometown *exports* and appointment

Consistent with China seeking to exert *diplomatic leverage*, rather than seeking friendly/equal relations

Motivation

Major challenge in studying authoritarian foreign policy:

- Lack of transparency

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In democratic systems:

- freedom of information legislation
  (Colaresi 2012, 2014; Nam 2012; Vzuffova 2020)
- public debates, hearings, investigations etc. in legislatures
  (Schultz 1998; Ramsay 2024; Fowler 2015)
- leaks, memoirs, oral histories from govt. officials
  (Joseph et al. 2022; Thrall 2024)

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In authoritarian systems:

- can infer interests and intentions from observable behavior

Motivation

Diplomats generally operate with substantial autonomy

(Malis 2021; Thrall 2024; Lindsey 2024; Kim & Fu 2024; Malis & Thrall 2024)

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Bureaucrats in China have significant discretion, across issue areas

(Lieberthal 1992; Landry 2008; Mertha 2009; Wang 2018; Chu et al 2021; Hou & Li 2023)

Motivation

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(Malis 2021; Thrall 2024; Lindsey 2024; Kim & Fu 2024; Malis & Thrall 2024)

Bureaucrats in China have significant discretion, across issue areas
(Lieberthal 1992; Landry 2008; Mertha 2009; Wang 2018; Chu et al 2021; Hou & Li 2023)

$\Longrightarrow$ Selection of ambassadors is a strategically important choice, reflecting China's foreign policy interests and intentions

Theoretical Expectations

Hometown ties:

- Important form of political/social connection in China
  (Fisman et al. 2018; 2020; Chu et al. 2021)
- as well as other authoritarian settings
  (Hodler & Raschky 2014; Do et al. 2017)

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Assumption: even after being appointed, ambassadors

1. internalize the economic interests of their hometowns
2. maintain relationships with political & business elites from their hometowns

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Two ways Chinese govt. might incorporate hometown ties into appointment strategy:

- "Incentives" channel
- "Leverage" channel

"Incentives" Channel

Appointing an ambassador whose hometown *exports* to the host country:

- Creates incentive for ambassador to maintain positive relations with host country
- Agency concerns

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Why would this be desirable, from home govt. perspective?

- Theory from Lindsey (2017, 2023):
  - Diplomat with sympathy/bias towards host country:
    - more credible messenger of threats/demands
  - Home govt. loses on some minor issues, gains on bigger issues
    - favorable tradeoff, on balance

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  - Home govt. loses on some minor issues, gains on bigger issues
    - favorable tradeoff, on balance
- Empirically:
  - Ideological sympathies strongly predict amb. appointments
  - (U.S. intelligence profiles of 1,300+ foreign ambs., 1964–1969)

"Incentives" Channel

Specific to Chinese context:

- Recent rhetoric emphasizing "win-win cooperation", "mutual respect", "inclusive globalization" (McConnell & Woon 2023)
- "Community of common destiny for mankind"

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- "Community of common destiny for mankind"

Prediction:

$\uparrow$ city o exports to country d

$\Longrightarrow$ $\uparrow$ Pr(appoint Amb. from city o to country d)

"Leverage" Channel

Alternatively, if ambassador's hometown *imports* from the host country:

- And if host country perceives ambassador to wield influence with hometown importing firms
  - $\Longrightarrow$ potential to restrict imports
- Gives amb. greater bargaining leverage vis-a-vis host govt

"Leverage" Channel

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- And if host country perceives ambassador to wield influence with hometown importing firms
  - $\Longrightarrow$ potential to restrict imports
- Gives amb. greater bargaining leverage vis-a-vis host govt

Less directly:

- Ambassador's presence serves as a "reminder" of host country's dependence on China
  - what they stand to lose from any downturn in relations

"Leverage" Channel

Specific to Chinese context:

- "Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics"
  - explicitly asserting hierarchical relationship with diplomatic partners

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  - explicitly asserting hierarchical relationship with diplomatic partners
- Counteracting the diplomatic corps' reputation for weakness/disloyalty (Chang-Liao 2022)

"Leverage" Channel

Specific to Chinese context:

- "Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics"
  - explicitly asserting hierarchical relationship with diplomatic partners
- Counteracting the diplomatic corps' reputation for weakness/disloyalty (Chang-Liao 2022)

Prediction:

$\uparrow$ city o imports from country d

$\Longrightarrow$ $\uparrow$ Pr(appoint Amb. from city o to country d)

Data

Original dataset on Chinese ambassadors:

- 728 ambassadors, over 1169 appointments, 2001–2016
- of these, we identified the hometowns of 455 ambassadors (789 appointments)

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Table: Frequency of Ambassador Hometowns

Rank	City	Province	Freq.	Percent
1	Shanghai	Shanghai	50	12.8
2	Beijing	Beijing	46	11.8
3	Tianjing	Tianjing	18	4.6
4	Baoding	Hebei	13	3.3
4	Nanjing	Jiangsu	13	3.3
4	Suzhou	Jiangsu	13	3.3
7	Wuhan	Hubei	12	3.1
8	Wuxi	Jiangsu	10	2.6
9	Harbin	Heilongjiang	7	1.8
10	Ningbo	Zhejiang	6	1.5
10	Changchun	Jilin	6	1.5

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Trade data from Chinese Customs Database

- originally at firm-product-country-year level
- aggregated to city-country-year level

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- aggregated to city-country-year level

Dataset for analysis:

- 918,276 city-country-year observations, 2001–2016
- 354 cities, 167 countries (59,118 city-country dyads)
- Outcome: $\mathbb{1}$[Amb. in country d in year t is from city o]

	mean	sd	min	max	% non-zero
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	6.42	7.08	0.00	25.16	0.47
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	2.62	5.59	0.00	24.52	0.19

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ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	2.62	5.59	0.00	24.52	0.19

Estimation:

- OLS with various FE; SE clustered by city and by country

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)	
	OLS	Logit
	(1)	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	
	(0.016)	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.089*	
	(0.042)	
ln Exports$_{o,t-1}$	0.024*	
	(0.011)	
ln Imports$_{o,t-1}$	−0.025*	
	(0.012)	
Num.Obs.	918 276	
Country-Year FE		
City-Year FE		
Year FE	X	
Country FE	X	
City FE	X	
Outcome mean	0.0025	
p-value for $\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.05	

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Column (5) restricted to city-years that are current ambassador hometowns. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)		
	OLS		Logit
	(1)	(2)	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	
	(0.016)	(0.017)	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.089*	0.088*	
	(0.042)	(0.042)	
ln Exports$_{o,t-1}$	0.024*	0.024*	
	(0.011)	(0.011)	
ln Imports$_{o,t-1}$	−0.025*	−0.025*	
	(0.012)	(0.012)	
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	
Country-Year FE		X	
City-Year FE			
Year FE	X		
Country FE	X		
City FE	X	X	
Outcome mean	0.0025	0.0025	
p-value for $\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.05	0.05	

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Column (5) restricted to city-years that are current ambassador hometowns. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)			
	OLS			Logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.009	
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.089*	0.088*	0.105**	
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	
ln Exports$_{o,t-1}$	0.024*	0.024*		
	(0.011)	(0.011)		
ln Imports$_{o,t-1}$	−0.025*	−0.025*		
	(0.012)	(0.012)		
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	918 276	
Country-Year FE		X		
City-Year FE			X	
Year FE	X			
Country FE	X		X	
City FE	X	X		
Outcome mean	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	
p-value for $\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.05	0.05	0.02	

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Column (5) restricted to city-years that are current ambassador hometowns. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs × 1000, for interpretability)				
	OLS				Logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.009	−0.011	
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.089*	0.088*	0.105**	0.104**	
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.040)	
ln Exports$_{o,t-1}$	0.024*	0.024*			
	(0.011)	(0.011)			
ln Imports$_{o,t-1}$	−0.025*	−0.025*			
	(0.012)	(0.012)			
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	918 276	918 276	
Country-Year FE		X		X	
City-Year FE			X	X	
Year FE	X				
Country FE	X		X		
City FE	X	X			
Outcome mean	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	
p-value for $\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Column (5) restricted to city-years that are current ambassador hometowns. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs × 1000, for interpretability)					
	OLS					Logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.009	−0.011	−0.064	
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.122)	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.089*	0.088*	0.105**	0.104**	0.347*	
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.157)	
ln Exports$_{o,t-1}$	0.024*	0.024*				
	(0.011)	(0.011)				
ln Imports$_{o,t-1}$	−0.025*	−0.025*				
	(0.012)	(0.012)				
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	918 276	918 276	160 713	
Country-Year FE		X		X	X	
City-Year FE			X	X	X	
Year FE	X					
Country FE	X		X			
City FE	X	X				
Outcome mean	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.014	
p-value for $\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.07	

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Column (5) restricted to city-years that are current ambassador hometowns. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs × 1000, for interpretability)					
	OLS					Logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.009	−0.011	−0.064	0.000
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.122)	(0.013)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.089*	0.088*	0.105**	0.104**	0.347*	0.023*
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.157)	(0.009)
ln Exports$_{o,t-1}$	0.024*	0.024*				
	(0.011)	(0.011)				
ln Imports$_{o,t-1}$	−0.025*	−0.025*				
	(0.012)	(0.012)				
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	918 276	918 276	160 713	124 932
Country-Year FE		X		X	X	X
City-Year FE			X	X	X	X
Year FE	X					
Country FE	X		X			
City FE	X	X				
Outcome mean	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.0025	0.014	0.018
p-value for $\beta_1 = \beta_2$	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.18

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Column (5) restricted to city-years that are current ambassador hometowns. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)
	(1)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011
	(0.018)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**
	(0.040)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-2}$	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-2}$	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-4}$	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-4}$	
Amb Appoint$_{o,d,t-4}$	
Num.Obs.	918 276
Country-Year FE	X
City-Year FE	X
City-Country FE	

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)	
	(1)	(2)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013
	(0.018)	(0.014)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.011
	(0.040)	(0.024)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-2}$		
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-2}$		
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-4}$		
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-4}$		
Amb Appoint$_{o,d,t-4}$		
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276
Country-Year FE	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X
City-Country FE		X

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.006
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.011	0.059*
	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.027)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-2}$			−0.011
			(0.015)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-2}$			0.066*
			(0.029)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-4}$			
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-4}$			
Amb Appoint$_{o,d,t-4}$			
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	859 158
Country-Year FE	X	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X	X
City-Country FE		X	

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.006	−0.003
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.011	0.059*	0.049*
	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.022)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-2}$			−0.011	−0.021
			(0.015)	(0.014)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-2}$			0.066*	0.067*
			(0.029)	(0.026)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-4}$				
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-4}$				
Amb Appoint$_{o,d,t-4}$				123.583***
				(14.200)
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	859 158	682 158
Country-Year FE	X	X	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X	X	X
City-Country FE		X		

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.006	−0.003	
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.011	0.059*	0.049*	
	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.022)	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-2}$			−0.011	−0.021	
			(0.015)	(0.014)	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-2}$			0.066*	0.067*	
			(0.029)	(0.026)	
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-4}$					0.001
					(0.023)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-4}$					0.107*
					(0.045)
Amb Appoint$_{o,d,t-4}$				123.583***	
				(14.200)	
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	859 158	682 158	740 922
Country-Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X	X	X	X
City-Country FE		X			

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.013	−0.006	−0.003		
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)		
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.011	0.059*	0.049*		
	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.022)		
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-2}$			−0.011	−0.021		
			(0.015)	(0.014)		
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-2}$			0.066*	0.067*		
			(0.029)	(0.026)		
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-4}$					0.001	−0.008
					(0.023)	(0.022)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-4}$					0.107*	0.092*
					(0.045)	(0.039)
Amb Appoint$_{o,d,t-4}$				123.583***		123.581***
				(14.200)		(14.199)
Num.Obs.	918 276	918 276	859 158	682 158	740 922	682 158
Country-Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
City-Country FE		X				

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country. + p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

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- Permutation inference:
  - take all appointments in a given year, count # with positive hometown–host country trade volumes
  - scramble the appointments, compare realized trade connections to null distribution
  - realized imports are 99.96 pctl, realized exports are 51 pctl

"Partner" Countries



- "cooperative partnerships", "all-around cooperative partnerships", "good neighborly partnerships", "strategic partnerships", "all-weather strategic cooperative partnerships"... increase from 9% to 48% of countries

	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)
	(1)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	-0.011
	(0.018)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**
	(0.040)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$	
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$	
Sample	Full
Num.Obs.	918 276
Country-Year FE	X
City-Year FE	X

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country.
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	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)	
	(1)	(2)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.024
	(0.018)	(0.041)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.005
	(0.040)	(0.025)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$		
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$		
Sample	Full	Partners
Num.Obs.	918 276	219 834
Country-Year FE	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country.
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	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.024	−0.008
	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.021)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.005	0.159*
	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.066)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$			
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$			
Sample	Full	Partners	Non-Partners
Num.Obs.	918 276	219 834	698 442
Country-Year FE	X	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X	X

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country.
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	DV: Ambassadorial Appointment$_{o,d,t}$ (coefs $\times$ 1000, for interpretability)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$	−0.011	−0.024	−0.008	−0.025
	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.021)	(0.019)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$	0.104**	−0.005	0.159*	0.156*
	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.066)	(0.073)
ln Exports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$				0.051*
				(0.023)
ln Imports$_{o,d,t-1}$ $\times$ Partner$_{d,t}$				−0.130
				(0.085)
Sample	Full	Partners	Non-Partners	Full
Num.Obs.	918 276	219 834	698 442	915 682
Country-Year FE	X	X	X	X
City-Year FE	X	X	X	X

Note: City-country-year observations, for city o, country d, year t. "Imports" and "exports" from the city's perspective. Standard errors clustered two ways, by city and by country.
+ p $<$ 0.1, * p $<$ 0.05, ** p $<$ 0.01, *** p $<$ 0.001

Conclusion

"Leverage" mechanism seems to dominate

- China asserting its economic power over other countries through ambassadorial appointments
- But only with non-partner countries

"Incentives" mechanism more prevalent among partner countries

- Countries viewed as more equal in status

Thank you!

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