



The Bureaucratic Politics of International Cooperation


Matt Malis
(Texas A&M)

Calvin Thrall
(Columbia)

17 November 2023









Ambassadors and international cooperation:

- ▶ Lindsey (2017, 2023); Gertz (2018); Malis (2021); Ahmed & Slasky (2022); Goldfien (2023); Arias (2023); Suong (2023); Kim & Fu (2023); Jost & Min (2023)

U.S. Embassies Over Time



Diplomatic Personnel per U.S. Embassy



This paper:

- ▶ Most comprehensive dataset on U.S. diplomatic personnel
- ▶ Use officer-level attributes to develop measures of embassy-level capacity
- ▶ Show that embassy capacity affects bilateral cooperation
 - ▶ esp. when pol. oversight ↓ & bureaucratic autonomy ↑

Theory

Diplomats in-country have stronger **preferences** for bilateral cooperation (vs. other participants in policy process), due to:

- ▶ *ideology*: selection and/or socialization (Lindsey (2017; 2023); Jost, Meshkin & Schub (2022); Wilson (1989); Gailmard & Patty (2007))
- ▶ *incentives*: producing measurable diplomatic outputs (Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991); Poulsen & Aisbett (2016))

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Diplomats vary in their **capacity** to enact their preferences

Theory


Diplomats in-country have stronger **preferences** for bilateral cooperation (vs. other participants in policy process), due to:

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
Diplomats vary in their **capacity** to enact their preferences

Effect of capacity conditional on political **attention** & **oversight**

White House Attention



White House Attention



Three quantities to operationalize:

- ▶ Diplomatic capacity
- ▶ WH attention/oversight
- ▶ Bilateral cooperation

Outcome: Bilateral Treaties

- ▶ 5,636 executive agreements, signed 1988–2017
(Hathaway, Bradley, & Goldsmith 2020)

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(Hathaway, Bradley, & Goldsmith 2020)
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 - ▶ (both are treaties under international law)

Outcome: Bilateral Treaties

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 - ▶ (both are treaties under international law)

Defense	1635
Finance, Trade, and Investment	623
Humanitarian	605
Science, Space, and Technology	549
Environment, Conservation, and Energy	495
Transportation and Aviation	393
Law Enforcement	313
Nonproliferation	273
Miscellaneous	196
Educational Exchanges and Cultural Cooperation	174
Taxation	138
Diplomacy and Consular Affairs	126
Maritime	115

Outcome Measure: Bilateral Treaties

Subcategories among the 1635 “Defense” agreements:

Acquisition & Cross-servicing	355
Status of Forces	290
Information Exchange & Information Security	254
Training & Assistance	219
Joint Initiatives & Projects	199
R&D, Testing	111
Alliances & Commitments	79
Benefits	76
Other	33
Facilities & Bases	23
Counterterrorism	10

Typical embassy “country team”, from Kopp & Gillespie




Figure 6.1
Organization of a Typical Mission

5 1.40/5:991/1 876-B

United States Department of State

7X
65
26
91
in.

Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts

UNIV. OF MICH.

MAY 17 1991

Guide for
Business Representatives

January 1991



MAY 19 1991

DEPOSITED BY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MOROCCO

RABAT (E), 2 Ave. de Marrakech; P.O. Box 120; APO N Y 09284; Tel [212] (7) 622-65; Telex 31005

AMB:	E. Michael Ussery	RSO:	Peter Stella
DCM:	Richard L. Jackson	AGR:	Andrew A. Duymovic
POL:	Michael C. Lemmon	AID:	Dennis Chandler
ECO:	David S. Robins	PAO:	Edward T. Penney
CON:	George W. Brazier III	ODA:	Col James E. Murphy USMC
ADM:	Alphonse Lopez	MLO:	Col Thomas E. Burch USAF

CASABLANCA (CG), 8 Blvd. Moulay Youssef; APO NY 09284 (CAS); Tel [212] 26-45-50

CG:	Timberlake Foster	ECO:	Allen S. Greenberg
LAB:	William H. Owen	CON:	Suella Pipal
POL:	Peter McDevitt	ADM:	J. Patrick Truhn
COM:	Samuel D. Starrett	BPAO:	Elizabeth Thornhill

MARRAKECH (US Information Service), Ave Echchouada, L'Hivernage B.P. 240; Tel [212] (4) 472-83

BPAO: Franklin Huffman

Key Officers Data

(Collected in collaboration with David Lindsey (CUNY))

At the officer-quarter-year level:

- ▶ 472,299 officer-QY obs., 1966–2017
- ▶ 352,562 in embassies
- ▶ 274,030 in embassies, 1988–2017 (our sample)

At the embassy-quarter-year level (this analysis):

- ▶ $n = 11,514$ embassy-QYs, 176 embassies, 77 QYs, 1989–2016

Diplomatic Capacity

Four separate measures of embassy-level capacity:


- ▶ Capacity _{c,q,t} , for country c , quarter q , year t

1. Embassy Size: # officers listed in U.S. embassy in c, q, t


2-4. Avg. Time in Post/Region/Service:

- ▶ For each officer-QY, calculate: (i) time in current post; (ii) total time spent in current region; (iii) time since first appearance in the data
- ▶ At the embassy-QY level: average (i), (ii), and (iii), across Ambassador, DCM, and FSO generalists (Political, Econ, Mgmt, Consular, Public Diplomacy)


Embassy Size




Average Time In Post (ATIP)




Average Time In Region (ATIR)



Average Time In Service (ATIS)




White House Attention



Political Attention/Oversight

Presidential re-election as a shock to foreign policy attention

- ▶ Lindsey & Hobbs (2015): meetings in President's Daily Diary
- ▶ Bubeck et al (2022): presidential public papers & executive orders; congressional speeches, bills, laws
- ▶ Durante & Zhuravskaya (2018): network news coverage
- ▶ presidential visits:



Research Design

- ▶ Embassy-quarter-year obs.
- ▶ Outcome: # agreements signed
- ▶ Treatment: pres. re-election period (2nd half of 4th year)
- ▶ Moderator: embassy-level capacity

Research Design

		election	
	emb_size_bin	0	1
1	[4,15]	0.14	0.10
2	(15,22]	0.23	0.28
3	(22,82]	0.47	0.71

Research Design

		election	
	emb_size_bin	0	1
1	[4,15]	0.14	0.10
2	(15,22]	0.23	0.28
3	(22,82]	0.47	0.71

		election	
	atip_bin	0	1
1	[0,0.969]	0.23	0.23
2	(0.969,1.42]	0.27	0.34
3	(1.42,5.12]	0.32	0.49

		election	
	atir_bin	0	1
1	[0,2.33]	0.22	0.25
2	(2.33,3.5]	0.29	0.36
3	(3.5,12.8]	0.31	0.41


		election	
	atis_bin	0	1
1	[0,6.14]	0.19	0.19
2	(6.14,8.9]	0.26	0.35
3	(8.9,26.8]	0.37	0.49

Research Design

$$\text{Agreements}_{cqt} = \text{Capacity}_{cqt} \times \text{Elec}_{qt} + \text{Controls}_{cqt} \times \text{Elec}_{qt} + \text{FE}$$

- ▶ Controls: GDP, pop., trade, aid, UNGA voting, capabilities, polity, recent severed relations, (emb. size)
- ▶ FE: Q-Y, and Region or Embassy
- ▶ OLS (Poisson for robustness)
- ▶ SE two-way clustered, by city and Q-Y

Embassy-Level: # Officers




- ▶ DV (# treaties signed): mean = 0.3, sd = 0.7
- ▶ emb_size (# officers): mean = 19, sd = 7.6
- ▶ n = 11,514 embassy-QYs (176 embassies, 77 QYs, 1989–2016)
- ▶ all models: region FE, QY FE, controls, SE clustered by emb. & year

	baseline	embassy FE	poisson	X elec	X elec, E-FE	X elec, E-FE (hardship FE)	X elec, poisson
EMB_SIZE(15,22]	0.004 (0.026)	-0.005 (0.026)	0.089 (0.083)	-0.001 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.027)	0.026 (0.034)	0.050 (0.087)
EMB_SIZE(22,82]	0.147* (0.056)	0.078* (0.032)	0.447* (0.181)	0.131* (0.057)	0.064+ (0.034)	0.076+ (0.039)	0.394* (0.190)
EMB_SIZE(15,22] × elec				0.074 (0.067)	0.063 (0.093)	0.195*** (0.042)	0.568 (0.393)
EMB_SIZE(22,82] × elec				0.227* (0.109)	0.203+ (0.111)	0.329*** (0.046)	0.750+ (0.436)
Num.Obs.	11 514	11 514	11 514	11 514	11 514	7742	11 514
FE: qy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: region	X		X	X			X
FE: city		X			X	X	
FE: hardship						X	
Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls X elec				X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Embassy-Level: Avg. Time In Post (ATIP)




- ▶ DV (# treaties signed): mean = 0.3, sd = 0.7
- ▶ ATIP (years): mean = 1.2, sd = 0.6
- ▶ n = 11,514 embassy-QYs (176 embassies, 77 QYs, 1989–2016)
- ▶ all models: region FE, QY FE, controls, SE clustered by emb. & year

	baseline	embassy FE	poisson	X elec	X elec, E-FE	X elec, E-FE (hardship FE)	X elec, poisson
ATIP(0.969,1.42]	0.000 (0.018)	0.009 (0.015)	0.023 (0.061)	-0.005 (0.020)	0.006 (0.015)	0.012 (0.024)	0.005 (0.065)
ATIP(1.42,5.12]	-0.009 (0.024)	0.008 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.070)	-0.015 (0.025)	0.003 (0.019)	0.012 (0.027)	-0.035 (0.070)
ATIP(0.969,1.42] × elec				0.045 (0.032)	0.030 (0.044)	0.096** (0.025)	0.188 (0.167)
ATIP(1.42,5.12] × elec				0.076 (0.068)	0.078 (0.062)	0.186*** (0.042)	0.209 (0.227)
Num.Obs.	11 514	11 514	11 514	11 514	11 514	7742	11 514
FE: qy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: region	X		X	X			X
FE: city		X			X	X	
FE: hardship						X	
Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls X elec				X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Embassy-Level: Avg. Time In Region (ATIR)




- ▶ DV (# treaties signed): mean = 0.3, sd = 0.7
- ▶ ATIR (years): mean = 3.1, sd = 1.4
- ▶ n = 11,514 embassy-QYs (176 embassies, 77 QYs, 1989–2016)
- ▶ all models: region FE, QY FE, controls, SE clustered by emb. & year

	baseline	embassy FE	poisson	X elec	X elec, E-FE	X elec, E-FE (hardship FE)	X elec, poisson
ATIR(2.33,3.5]	0.033+ (0.018)	0.026+ (0.014)	0.119* (0.057)	0.034 (0.020)	0.024 (0.015)	0.033 (0.028)	0.126+ (0.065)
ATIR(3.5,12.8]	0.010 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.056 (0.045)	0.010 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.022)	0.056 (0.052)
ATIR(2.33,3.5] × elec				-0.045 (0.063)	-0.010 (0.048)	0.027 (0.054)	-0.165 (0.247)
ATIR(3.5,12.8] × elec				-0.011 (0.044)	0.011 (0.037)	0.090+ (0.043)	-0.035 (0.195)
Num.Obs.	11 503	11 503	11 503	11 503	11 503	7738	11 503
FE: qy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: region	X		X	X			X
FE: city		X			X	X	
FE: hardship						X	
Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls X elec				X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Embassy-Level: Avg. Time In Service (ATIS)



- ▶ DV (# treaties signed): mean = 0.3, sd = 0.7
- ▶ ATIS (years): mean = 7.8, sd = 3.2
- ▶ n = 11,514 embassy-QYs (176 embassies, 77 QYs, 1989–2016)
- ▶ all models: region FE, QY FE, controls, SE clustered by emb. & year

	baseline	embassy FE	poisson	X elec	X elec, E-FE	X elec, E-FE (hardship FE)	X elec, poisson
ATIS(6.14,8.9]	0.011 (0.017)	0.012 (0.014)	0.064 (0.066)	0.005 (0.019)	0.007 (0.015)	0.028 (0.019)	0.041 (0.084)
ATIS(8.9,26.8]	0.024 (0.028)	-0.005 (0.025)	0.058 (0.097)	0.017 (0.032)	-0.013 (0.025)	0.028 (0.030)	0.028 (0.116)
ATIS(6.14,8.9] × elec				0.069 (0.063)	0.056 (0.058)	-0.032 (0.063)	0.249 (0.243)
ATIS(8.9,26.8] × elec				0.095* (0.042)	0.101*** (0.027)	0.130** (0.038)	0.341* (0.169)
Num.Obs.	11 509	11 509	11 509	11 509	11 509	7740	11 509
FE: qy	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FE: region	X		X	X			X
FE: city		X			X	X	
FE: hardship						X	
Controls	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Controls X elec				X	X	X	X

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Residualized Embassy Size

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Kenya	7.87	77
2	North Macedonia	6.41	59
3	France	6.14	76
4	Mexico	6.04	77
5	Italy	5.95	76
6	Thailand	5.33	77
7	Japan	5.15	77
8	Senegal	5.07	77
9	Botswana	4.78	76
10	Philippines	4.72	77
11	Kuwait	4.62	72
12	Barbados	4.51	77
13	Austria	4.31	76
14	Panama	4.17	74
15	Vietnam	4.12	57
16	Mauritius	3.62	77
17	Seychelles	3.61	14
18	Georgia	3.5	65
19	Singapore	3.06	77
20	El Salvador	2.96	77
--	--	--	--

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Libya	-8.2	20
2	Equatorial Guinea	-6.06	43
3	Brunei	-5.88	68
4	Papua New Guinea	-5.31	77
5	Central African Republic	-4.86	54
6	Algeria	-4.6	77
7	Switzerland	-4.56	77
8	South Sudan	-4.34	16
9	New Zealand	-4.23	77
10	Czechia	-4.17	65
11	Slovakia	-4.16	63
12	Brazil	-4.03	77
13	Congo - Brazzaville	-4.03	74
14	Costa Rica	-3.8	77
15	Benin	-3.54	77
16	Lithuania	-3.54	65
17	Malaysia	-3.49	77
18	Yemen	-3.33	68
19	Uruguay	-3.32	77
20	Belarus	-3.27	32

Residualized ATIS

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Cape Verde	4.13	73
2	Jamaica	3.52	76
3	Guinea-Bissau	3.3	19
4	India	3.03	69
5	Central African Republic	2.97	54
6	Nigeria	2.91	78
7	Kenya	2.81	77
8	United Kingdom	2.52	77
9	Marshall Islands	2.41	63
10	Eswatini	2.34	76
11	Egypt	2.2	77
12	Seychelles	2.2	14
13	Palau	2.06	43
14	Argentina	1.99	76
15	Iraq	1.86	46
16	Jordan	1.78	77
17	Senegal	1.74	77
18	Ukraine	1.72	65
19	Liberia	1.71	77
20	Greece	1.69	77

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Yemen Arab Republic	-3.94	6
2	Angola	-3.58	62
3	Mozambique	-3.06	77
4	Slovakia	-2.84	63
5	Algeria	-2.78	77
6	Mauritius	-2.7	77
7	China	-2.47	74
8	Czechoslovakia	-2.04	11
9	Trinidad & Tobago	-2.04	76
10	Paraguay	-1.88	77
11	Australia	-1.85	77
12	Belarus	-1.85	32
13	Niger	-1.75	76
14	Myanmar (Burma)	-1.73	18
15	Ecuador	-1.72	69
16	Finland	-1.67	77
17	Tajikistan	-1.67	60
18	Hungary	-1.62	77
19	Ireland	-1.62	77
20	Oman	-1.6	77

Disaggregating by Issue Area


Different measure of capacity:

- ▶ presence of issue-specific attaché at embassy

$$\text{Agreements}_{icqt} = \text{Attaché Present}_{icqt} \times \text{Elec}_{qt} + \text{Controls}_{iqt} \times \text{Elec}_{qt} + \text{FE}$$


- ▶ issue i , country c , quarter q , year t

Embassy-Issue-Level: Attaché Presence



- ▶ DV (treaty signed, 1/0): mean = 0.02, sd = 0.15
- ▶ n = 149,166 embassy-issue-QYs (9 issue areas)
- ▶ all models: region FE, QY FE, issue FE, controls, SE clustered by emb. & year

Embassy-Issue-Level: Attaché Presence



- ▶ DV (treaty signed, 1/0): mean = 0.02, sd = 0.15
- ▶ n = 149,166 embassy-issue-QYs (9 issue areas)
- ▶ all models: region FE, QY FE, issue FE, controls, SE clustered by emb. & year
- ▶ high priority: military, law enforcement, commercial, treasury, agricultural
- ▶ low priority: science, aviation, health, aid

Thank you!

- ▶ Matt Malis `mattmalis.github.io`
- ▶ Calvin Thrall `calvinthrall.com`
- ▶ Measuring American Diplomacy (MAD) Project:
 `measuringdiplomacy.github.io/`