

Diplomatic Capacity and International Cooperation

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Texas Triangle International Relations Conference
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
ARE BUREAUCRACIES IMPORTANT? (OR ALLISON WONDERLAND)

by Stephen D. Krasner


Who and what shapes foreign policy? In recent years, analyses have increasingly emphasized not rational calculations of the national interest or the political goals of national leaders but rather bureaucratic procedures and bureaucratic politics. Starting

this approach has come to portray the American President as trapped by a permanent government more enemy than ally. Bureaucratic theorists imply that it is exceedingly difficult if not impossible for political leaders to control the organizational web which surrounds them. Important decisions result from numerous smaller actions taken by individuals at different levels in the bureaucracy who have partially incompatible national, bureaucratic, political, and personal objectives. They are not necessarily a reflection of the aims and values of high officials.

U.S. Embassies Over Time



Diplomatic Personnel per U.S. Embassy



This paper:

- ▶ Theory: *conditional* nature of bureaucratic influence
- ▶ Most comprehensive dataset on U.S. diplomatic personnel
- ▶ Use officer-level attributes to develop measures of embassy-level capacity
- ▶ Show that embassy capacity affects bilateral cooperation
 - ▶ only when pol. oversight ↓ & bureaucratic autonomy ↑

Theory

Diplomats in-country have stronger **preferences** for bilateral cooperation (vs. other participants in policy process), due to:

- ▶ *ideology*: selection and/or socialization (Lindsey (2017; 2023); Jost, Meshkin & Schub (2022); Wilson (1989); Gailmard & Patty (2007))
- ▶ *incentives*: producing measurable diplomatic outputs (Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991); Poulsen & Aisbett (2016))

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Diplomats vary in their **capacity** to enact their policy preferences


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
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Diplomats vary in their **capacity** to enact their policy preferences
Effects of capacity conditional on **autonomy**

White House Attention



White House Attention



Three quantities to operationalize:

- ▶ Diplomatic capacity
- ▶ WH attention
- ▶ Bilateral cooperation

Outcome: Bilateral Treaties

- ▶ 5,636 executive agreements, signed 1989–2016
(Hathaway, Bradley, & Goldsmith 2020)

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Typical embassy “country team”, from Kopp & Gillespie




Figure 6.1

Organization of a Typical Mission

5 1.40/5:991/1 876-B

United States Department of State

7X
65
26
91
in.

Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts

UNIV. OF MICH.

MAY 17 1991

Guide for
Business Representatives

January 1991



MAY 1991

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MOROCCO

RABAT (E), 2 Ave. de Marrakech; P.O. Box 120; APO N Y 09284; Tel [212] (7) 622-65; Telex 31005

AMB:	E. Michael Ussery	RSO:	Peter Stella
DCM:	Richard L. Jackson	AGR:	Andrew A. Duymovic
POL:	Michael C. Lemmon	AID:	Dennis Chandler
ECO:	David S. Robins	PAO:	Edward T. Penney
CON:	George W. Brazier III	ODA:	Col James E. Murphy USMC
ADM:	Alphonse Lopez	MLO:	Col Thomas E. Burch USAF

CASABLANCA (CG), 8 Blvd. Moulay Youssef; APO NY 09284 (CAS); Tel [212] 26-45-50

CG:	Timberlake Foster	ECO:	Allen S. Greenberg
LAB:	William H. Owen	CON:	Suella Pipal
POL:	Peter McDevitt	ADM:	J. Patrick Truhn
COM:	Samuel D. Starrett	BPAO:	Elizabeth Thornhill

MARRAKECH (US Information Service), Ave Echchouada, L'Hivernage B.P. 240; Tel [212] (4) 472-83

BPAO: Franklin Huffman

Key Officers Data

(Collected in collaboration with David Lindsey (CUNY))

At the officer-quarter-year level:

- ▶ 472,299 officer-QY obs., 1966–2017
- ▶ 352,562 in embassies
- ▶ 274,030 in embassies, 1989–2016 (our sample)

At the country-half-year level (this analysis):

- ▶ $n = 6,197$ country-half-years, 169 country, 47 HYs, 1989–2016

Diplomatic Capacity

Four separate measures of embassy-level capacity:


- ▶ $\text{Capacity}_{c,t}$, for country c , half-year t

1. Embassy Size: # officers listed in U.S. embassy in c, t


2-4. Avg. Time in Post/Region/Service:

- ▶ For each officer-QY, calculate: (i) time in current post; (ii) total time spent in current region; (iii) time since first appearance in the data
- ▶ At the embassy-HY level: average (i), (ii), and (iii), across Ambassador, DCM, and FSO generalists (Political, Econ, Mgmt, Consular, Public Diplomacy)


Embassy Size




Avg. Time in Post



Avg. Time in Region



Avg. Time in Service




Correlation Among Capacity Measures

	Emb. Size	ATIP	ATIR	ATIS
Emb. Size	1.00			
ATIP	0.14	1.00		
ATIR	0.14	0.42	1.00	
ATIS	0.27	0.23	0.57	1.00

Capturing different aspects of capacity:

- ▶ Emb. Size: total # diplomat-hours
- ▶ ATIP: country-specific knowledge + working as team
- ▶ ATIR: region-specific + bureau-specific knowledge
- ▶ ATIS: general diplomatic expertise + screening


White House Attention




Political Attention/Oversight

Presidential re-election as a shock to foreign policy attention

- ▶ Lindsey & Hobbs (2015): meetings in President's Daily Diary
- ▶ Bubeck et al (2022): presidential public papers & executive orders; congressional speeches, bills, laws
- ▶ presidential visits:



Treaty Signing Over Time



Research Design


- ▶ Embassy-half-year obs.
- ▶ Outcome: # agreements signed
- ▶ Treatment: embassy-level capacity
- ▶ Moderator: pres. re-election period (2nd half of 4th year)

Research Design

$$\text{Agreements}_{ct} = \text{Capacity}_{ct} \times \text{Elec}_t + \text{Controls}_{ct} \times \text{Elec}_t + \text{FE}$$


- ▶ Controls: GDP, pop., trade, aid, UNGA voting, capabilities, polity, recent severed relations, recent MIDs, (emb. size); hardship
- ▶ FE: half-year, and Region or Embassy
- ▶ OLS (Poisson for robustness)
- ▶ SE two-way clustered, by embassy and half-year

Embassy-Level: # Officers




- ▶ DV (# treaties signed): mean = 0.59, sd = 1.18
- ▶ n = 6,197 country-half-years (169 countries, 47 HYs, 1989–2016)
- ▶ all models: region FE, HY FE, controls \times elec, SE clustered by country & HY

Embassy-Level: Avg. Time In Post (ATIP)




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Embassy-Level: Avg. Time In Region (ATIR)



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- ▶ n = 6,197 country-half-years (169 countries, 47 HYs, 1989–2016)
- ▶ all models: region FE, HY FE, controls × elec, SE clustered by country & HY

Embassy-Level: Avg. Time In Service (ATIS)



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Issue-Level Research Design


$$\mathbb{1}[\text{Any Agreement}_{ict}] = \text{Attaché}_{ct} \times \text{Elec}_t + \text{Controls}_{ct} \times \text{Elec}_t + \text{FE}$$

- ▶ Controls: GDP, pop., trade, aid, UNGA voting, capabilities, polity, recent severed relations, recent MIDs, (emb. size)
- ▶ OLS, w/ SE two-way clustered, by embassy and half-year

Issue areas:

- ▶ high-priority: military, commercial, law enforcement, treasury, agricultural
- ▶ low-priority: aid, health, scientific, aviation

Embassy-Issue-Level: Attaché Presence



- ▶ DV ($\mathbb{1}[\text{any treaty signed}]$): mean = 0.045
- ▶ n = 62,109 country-issue-half-years (34,505 for high-priority, 27,604 for low-priority)
- ▶ all models: controls \times elec, SE clustered by country & half-year

Thank you!

- ▶ Matt Malis <https://matmmalis.github.io/>
- ▶ Calvin Thrall <https://www.calvinthrall.com/>

Theory

Ability to realize preferences in policy outcomes depends on **capacity** and **autonomy**

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$$y = e_E + e_{WH} - e_E e_{WH}, \quad u_i = y - c_i e_i^2$$

- ▶ y : diplomatic output (joint production with substitution)
- ▶ e_E, e_{WH} : effort by Embassy and White House
- ▶ c_i : costs of effort (conversely, $\frac{1}{c_i}$ = capacity)

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$$\frac{dy}{dc_{WH}} < 0, \quad \frac{d^2 y}{dc_{WH} dc_E} < 0$$

- ▶ less production when WH faces higher costs of effort
- ▶ exacerbated under conditions of low embassy capacity

Theory

Alternatively:

$$y = (1 - p)e_E, \quad u_E = y - c_E e_E^2$$

- ▶ p : prob. WH veto or delay
- ▶ if $p \downarrow$ in c_{WH} :

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Prediction: When the White House faces greater constraints on its ability to actively engage in diplomacy, that should heighten the disparity in diplomatic output between high-capacity vs. low-capacity embassies.

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Residualized Embassy Size

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Kenya	7.53	47
2	Mexico	6.06	47
3	Italy	5.62	46
4	Botswana	4.82	46
5	France	4.81	47
6	Thailand	4.77	47
7	Kuwait	4.53	43
8	Japan	4.48	47
9	Vietnam	4.27	32
10	Barbados	3.77	47
11	Panama	3.76	45
12	Georgia	3.23	38
13	Armenia	3.08	37
14	Liberia	3.04	47
15	Greece	3.03	47
16	Afghanistan	2.95	26
17	Ghana	2.84	46
18	Philippines	2.76	47
19	United Arab Emirates	2.52	47
20	Bulgaria	2.46	47

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Libya	-7.25	10
2	Equatorial Guinea	-6.35	18
3	New Zealand	-5.86	47
4	Brunei	-5.81	33
5	Papua New Guinea	-4.53	47
6	Bosnia & Herzegovina	-3.87	33
7	Algeria	-3.55	47
8	South Sudan	-3.41	8
9	Malaysia	-3.28	47
10	Switzerland	-3.28	47
11	Venezuela	-2.93	35
12	Yemen	-2.88	41
13	Costa Rica	-2.85	47
14	Brazil	-2.83	47
15	Cape Verde	-2.73	28
16	Trinidad & Tobago	-2.63	46
17	Saudi Arabia	-2.62	47
18	Benin	-2.61	46
19	Slovakia	-2.61	37
20	Nigeria	-2.58	48

Residualized ATIP

	countryStandardized	avg_resid	n_qy
	<chr>	<dbl>	<int>
1	Palau	1.8	22
2	Uganda	0.31	34
3	Jordan	0.26	47
4	Kenya	0.25	47
5	Senegal	0.23	47
6	Morocco	0.22	47
7	Indonesia	0.2	47
8	Poland	0.2	45
9	Zimbabwe	0.2	47
10	Bangladesh	0.19	47
11	France	0.19	47
12	Liberia	0.17	47
13	Bahrain	0.16	47
14	Uruguay	0.16	47
15	Egypt	0.15	47
16	India	0.14	43
17	Congo - Kinshasa	0.13	47
18	Finland	0.13	47
19	Mexico	0.13	47
20	Greece	0.11	47

	countryStandardized	avg_resid	n_qy
	<chr>	<dbl>	<int>
1	Iraq	-0.53	24
2	Afghanistan	-0.39	26
3	Brunei	-0.35	33
4	New Zealand	-0.29	47
5	Bosnia & Herzegovina	-0.28	33
6	Libya	-0.25	10
7	Papua New Guinea	-0.25	47
8	Yemen	-0.24	41
9	Lebanon	-0.2	43
10	South Sudan	-0.2	8
11	Albania	-0.19	39
12	Angola	-0.19	36
13	Central African Republic	-0.18	27
14	Equatorial Guinea	-0.18	18
15	Gambia	-0.17	42
16	Tajikistan	-0.17	33
17	Australia	-0.16	47
18	Burundi	-0.16	47
19	Marshall Islands	-0.16	28
20	Belarus	-0.15	20

Residualized ATIR

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Palau	3.58	22
2	Marshall Islands	1.4	28
3	Syria	1.19	25
4	United Kingdom	1.14	47
5	Venezuela	1.08	35
6	Germany	1.04	41
7	Brunei	1	33
8	Guatemala	0.96	47
9	Argentina	0.91	46
10	Jamaica	0.8	46
11	Kenya	0.78	47
12	Brazil	0.74	47
13	Eswatini	0.74	46
14	Dominican Republic	0.72	47
15	Egypt	0.71	47
16	Honduras	0.69	47
17	Congo - Kinshasa	0.67	47
18	Sierra Leone	0.67	47
19	Greece	0.6	47
20	Nepal	0.6	41

	countryStandardized <chr>	avg_resid <dbl>	n_qy <int>
1	Canada	-1.28	47
2	South Sudan	-1.27	8
3	Papua New Guinea	-1.08	47
4	Mauritius	-0.96	47
5	Angola	-0.89	36
6	Libya	-0.88	10
7	New Zealand	-0.88	47
8	Australia	-0.86	47
9	Belarus	-0.84	20
10	Morocco	-0.83	47
11	Azerbaijan	-0.8	38
12	Afghanistan	-0.77	26
13	Haiti	-0.72	44
14	Portugal	-0.72	46
15	Bahamas	-0.71	47
16	Trinidad & Tobago	-0.69	46
17	Belize	-0.66	47
18	Spain	-0.63	47
19	Montenegro	-0.62	16
20	Bosnia & Herzegovina	-0.61	33

Residualized ATIS

countryStandardized	avg_resid	n_qy
<chr>	<dbl>	<int>
1 Cape Verde	3.95	28
2 Jamaica	3.45	46
3 India	3.09	43
4 Marshall Islands	2.69	28
5 Nigeria	2.66	48
6 Kenya	2.58	47
7 Eswatini	2.43	46
8 Palau	2.42	22
9 Argentina	2.19	46
10 Central African Republic	2.19	27
11 Iraq	2.17	24
12 United Kingdom	2.16	47
13 Vietnam	2.09	32
14 Equatorial Guinea	2.02	18
15 Greece	1.98	47
16 Liberia	1.67	47
17 Brunei	1.61	33
18 Egypt	1.61	47
19 Laos	1.56	38
20 Tunisia	1.55	47

countryStandardized	avg_resid	n_qy
<chr>	<dbl>	<int>
1 Slovakia	-2.81	37
2 Mauritius	-2.78	47
3 Mozambique	-2.69	47
4 Angola	-2.63	36
5 Ecuador	-2.3	43
6 Algeria	-2.25	47
7 China	-2.17	44
8 Niger	-2.09	46
9 Paraguay	-2.02	47
10 Trinidad & Tobago	-1.94	46
11 Oman	-1.84	47
12 Yemen	-1.76	41
13 Belarus	-1.67	20
14 Guinea	-1.58	47
15 Hungary	-1.58	47
16 Burundi	-1.56	47
17 Finland	-1.54	47
18 Bahamas	-1.51	47
19 Madagascar	-1.48	47
20 Tajikistan	-1.46	33